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We created a plausible hurricane scenario for the Ports of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI)
We identified and interviewed the “stakeholder cluster” around each port
We identified stakeholder perceptions of the broad range of impacts that a hurricane hitting the
port would have upon the stakeholder cluster.
We propose a typology for storm impacts on the port cluster that includes direct damages, indirect
costs, and intangible consequences resulting from such a storm hitting the port.
We found that the intangible consequences were of great concern to stakeholders.
We assessed how the costs of the impacts would be borne by different types of stakeholders and
found that intangible consequences in particular would be borne by society at large.
We found that formal planning and policy did not address many of these stakeholder concerns and
in particular did not address intangible consequences.
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TOWARD SEAPORT RESILIENCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:
STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF HURRICANE IMPACTS IN GULFPORT (MS)
AND PROVIDENCE (RI)

1. Introduction	
  
A growing body of research indicates that climate change is having and will continue to have a
range of impacts on human-environmental systems (IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Attention must be
given to reducing vulnerability and increasing the resilience of these systems (Patt 2013; Moser
and Boykoff 2013). Because the climate-related changes include increased storm activity
(Emanuel 2013) and a rise in sea levels (Rahmstorf 2010), seaports are expected to be especially
vulnerable (Becker et al. 2013; McEvoy et al. 2013; Asariotis and Benamara 2012), as many
ports are -by necessity- located in environmentally sensitive and high-risk locations. Seaports
and maritime shipping play vital roles in global trade and regional socio-economic stability
(AAPA 2013; World Bank 2010). With 99% of overseas U.S. trade by weight, carried by ship
(AAPA 2013), ports are the backbone of the national economy and International trade. Ports
serve as delivery centers of public goods and critical resources for the region of their
geographical location, to a wide variety of stakeholders such as public agencies, community
groups, and private businesses (Hall and Jacobs 2007; Notteboom and Winkelmans 2002) Recent
projections suggest a potentially crippling increase in asset exposure in each of the world’s 136
port mega-cities during this century (Nicholls et al. 2008; Lenton et al. 2009; Coumou and
Rahmstorf 2012). Combined, these new conditions of elevated sea levels plus more frequent and
intense tropical storms could result in a 10 to 100-fold increase in the likelihood of a major storm
event (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Grinsted et al. 2013).
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There is wide consensus that stakeholder engagement and participation will be an essential
component of adaptation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006) and that the
assessment of impacts should be conducted on a scale that is aligned with the scale at which
management occurs (Cash and Moser 2000). Thus, the current research is an academic
exploration focusing on the causes and consequences of harm and loss for particular peoples and
places, in this case stakeholders of seaports. It builds on the theory that stakeholder perceptions
must be considered for effective assessment and management of such consequences (Eakin and
Luers 2006).
Understanding the potential impacts of storms for different port stakeholders can help them plan
for a level of storm preparedness that is more appropriate for the new environmental conditions
presented by climate change (Koetse and Rietveld 2009). Without such understanding,
stakeholders are left to plan in a way that does not necessarily account for many indirect costs or
intangible consequences of such storm events -- impacts that will ultimately be borne by society.
To plan for a future with more extreme events in coastal areas, decision makers need to
understand what kinds of impacts result from storms hitting the local port, which stakeholders are
affected, and how to incorporate stakeholder concerns into the planning process. In this article,
we thus address the following three questions through case studies of two highly-exposed
seaports:
1) How do port stakeholders in Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) perceive the
impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port, and
2) How will internal and external stakeholders bear the costs resulting from a
hurricane hitting the port?
3) In what ways are port stakeholders considering the resilience of the port in planning
and policy?
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Our study provides a fine-grained analysis of hurricane impacts on seaport stakeholders through
a review of planning and policy documents, an analysis of interviews, and a review of each port's
resilience plans. We invited key stakeholders in the port cluster to review and respond to a
hurricane scenario. We identified and catalogued the wide range of impacts of storm events on
the port described by interviewees, as well analyzed which stakeholders would bear the cost of
impacts. We also examined how stakeholder concerns were accounted for in planning and
policy.
The target audience for this study is the constellation of planners, practitioners, and decisionmakers in the public and private sectors with responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of resilience plans and policy for seaports. They include: port planners, coastal
managers, urban planners, federal agencies, and others. The audience also includes the members
of the academic community who are concerned about the issues of stakeholder engagement and
furthering the efficacy of resilience planning.
Following the Introduction, Section 2 of this paper provides the background and context for the
study through a discussion of climate adaptation, the climate change challenge for seaports, the
seaport stakeholder cluster, and seaport resilience planning. We also discuss some of the
currently applied traditional methods of impact assessment, many of which are either at the
wrong scale or not suitable for ex ante assessments that decision makers need in order to plan for
more resilient seaports. In Section 3, we outline our approach and methods for the case studies
and provide an overview of the ports of Gulfport and Providence. Section 4 reports the results of
the study as a typology for hurricane impacts, illustrated with examples from key stakeholders
and the documents reviewed, with an assessment of which stakeholders will likely bear the costs
of specific impacts. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results in aggregate, addresses each of the
3

three original research questions. Though we did not intend this research as a comparative case
study, Section 5 also addresses some of the similarities and differences between these two cases.
We conclude with some implications for policy and a short discussion of the next steps for this
line of research.

2. Background	
  
2.1.

The	
  climate	
  challenge	
  for	
  seaports	
  

Climate change is accepted by the scientific community as an unequivocal fact (IPCC 2007).
Impacts of climate change are already being felt by society, and it is likely that impacts will in
the future affect all sectors of society and have wide-reaching impacts on human health, energy,
marine environments and fisheries, transportation infrastructure, forests, conservation areas, food
supplies and global security (IPCC 2007; IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Recent global projections
suggest that sea levels could rise by as much as 1.9 meters by 2100 (Schaeffer et al. 2012;
Vermeer and Rahmstorf 2009), which would exacerbate storm-surge impacts and wave damage
in many regions (Lin et al. 2012; IPCC 2012) especially if the intensity and frequency of tropical
storms also increase (Emanuel 2013; Bender et al. 2010). These new conditions pose substantial
challenges to ports (Asariotis and Benamara 2012; Oh and Reuveny 2010) due to the exposed
locations of ports in coastal zones, low-lying areas, the life spans of infrastructure assets, and
their interdependence with trade, shipping and inland transport services that are also climatically
vulnerable. The coastal or estuarine location of seaports suggests that the mean sea level (MSL)
rise, higher storm surges and river floods (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Von Storch et al. 2008; Jonkeren
et al. 2013), increased hurricane intensities/destructiveness (Elsner et al. 2008; Emanuel 2005)
and potential changes in wave regimes (IPCC 2012) could cause significant damage and

4

operational delays (Haveman and Shatz 2006; EQECAT Inc. 2012; PANYNJ 2012). These
extreme events cause coastal inundation/erosion, wind hazards and inland floods that can disrupt
entire transportation networks (USCCRP 2008). Some regions will find that the local sea level
rise will exceed the global mean, causing additional impacts from business losses due to these
natural disasters (Esteban et al. 2009; Hallegatte et al. 2011).
Many ports have already suffered from catastrophic storms even before climate change. Between
1960-2010, 282 U.S. ports had a named tropical storm pass within 50 kilometers (Figure 1). In
particular, ports along the U.S. Gulf and East Coasts have been hit directly by hurricanes, with
damages totaling in the billions of dollars (Blake et al. 2011). Hurricane Katrina caused $100
million to Mississippi’s ports (PEER 2006) and Hurricane Sandy generated over $50 billion in
damage to the New York and New Jersey region (EQECAT Inc. 2012) and the Port of New York
was shut down for over eight days (PANYNJ 2012).
Figure 1 -- Map of U.S. ports within 50km of named storm
2.2.

Climate	
  change	
  adaptation	
  -‐	
  Overview	
  of	
  theory	
  and	
  terms	
  

Adapting to the impacts of climate change has become a focus for researchers and the decision
makers at local, state, national, and International levels (NRC 2010; IPCC 2012), though little
work has addressed ports specifically. Adaptation, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), means “any adjustment in natural or human systems in response to
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
opportunities” (IPCC 2007).
The adaptation process incorporates steps that may be iterative, though defining the problem and
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initial solutions through identifying risks, vulnerabilities, and strategies, is generally a first step.
This requires an assessment of which stakeholders are at risk and should thus be engaged in the
adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks and impacts may be, and in what ways
systems may be vulnerable. Assessing vulnerability has been the subject of a great deal of
research in the emerging area of climate adaptation (Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010),
though approaches remain fragmented (Janssen et al. 2006).
As represented in (Figure 2), the first steps in the adaptation process in general, and for ports
specifically, requires the engagement of stakeholders and thus an assessment who should thus be
engaged in the adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks are, and in what ways the
port system in vulnerable.
Before identifying each stakeholder's position, implication and responsibility in this complex
structure, here is an overview of terminology used in the present research, to establish context:
Risk is the product of the probability of an event and the damage consequences that result. For
ports, the risk manifests primarily as a function of exposure to storms and the impacts that result
from a storm hitting the port.
Impacts are the effects on natural and human systems of disasters and are a key component of
vulnerability.
Vulnerability is defined as, “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected …
including the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover form the adverse affects of physical events” (IPCC
2012).
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Capacity is defined as “the combination of all the strengths, attributes, and resources available to
an individual, community, society, or organization that can be used to achieve established goals”
(IPCC 2012).
Exposure, in turn, is defined as “the presence of people, livelihoods, environmental services and
resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could be adversely
affected by physical events and which, thereby, are subject to potential future harm, loss, or
damage” (IPCC 2012).
Resilience generally refers to the “ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its
basic function and structure” (Walker et al. 2006). A large body of research has focused on the
resilience of natural coastal systems (Adger et al. 2005), due to concerns about the combined
pressures of human population growth and threats from natural disasters. Resilience is also topic
of growing interest among researchers in other areas ranging from architectural systems to
institutional (Eakin and Luers 2006), ecological systems (Walker et al. 2006) and security studies
(Coaffee and Wood 2006). Resilience theory and natural hazards research provides a lens
focusing on the problem identification and the implementation of solutions that include disaster
response and planning (Godschalk 1999; Birkmann et al. 2008; Collier et al. 2010). The National
Infrastructure Advisory Council defines infrastructure resilience as the ability to reduce the
magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events (NIAC 2009). The effectiveness of a resilient
infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly
recover from a potentially disruptive event (O'Rourke 2007).
A first step in approaching the climate change adaptation for seaports is establishing a
framework that provides a visual overview of a complex process. These help guide the
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adaptation process, allowing researchers and practitioners to better understand the necessary
steps for building resilience of the systems with which they are particularly concerned (NRC,
2010; Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Turner et al. 2003; Allison et al. 2009; Birkmann et al. 2013).
We use the framework represented in Figure 2 to provide context for this research because it
represents a common and rational approach to planning (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). This
framework emphasizes the importance of stakeholder engagement in adaption planning.
Researchers and practitioners increasingly recognize stakeholder engagement as an essential
component of successful adaptation planning processes and resilience building (Moser and
Boykoff 2013; Eakin and Luers 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that without support from
stakeholders, coastal management decisions are unlikely to be successfully implemented
(Tompkins et al. 2008). Stakeholder input helps assess and identify future socioeconomic
impacts (Van Kleef et al. 2006) that can result from hurricanes striking at seaports. Assessment
of these types of impacts, as well as the options for adaptation, are the first steps in the
adaptation process. Though other research has relied on stakeholder input to assess flood risk
(Van Kleef et al. 2006), impacts of sea level rise (Poumadère et al. 2008), and the broader
regional impacts of climate change more generally (Shackley and Deanwood 2002), these types
of impacts assessments have not been applied for stakeholders of seaports.
Figure 2 -- Climate adaptation process (NCADAC Draft)
2.3.

What	
  is	
  seaport	
  resilience?	
  

When used in reference to a seaport, “resilience” has many different meanings to different types
of stakeholders. In a case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey, for example, Smythe
(2013) found large variations in how stakeholders conceptualized the resilience of the port. Some
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described it in social terms, emphasizing the interconnectedness of different sectors. Others
thought primarily about the physical infrastructure and the transportation systems’ ability to
bounce back and recover, and others described it in economic terms, emphasizing the resilience
of supply chains, and others. In general though, a resilient port can “withstand an extreme natural
event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity or quality of life,
without a large amount of assistance from outside the community” (Mileti 1999). For the
purposes of this study and its focus on storm resilience, we define a resilient port more
specifically as one that, in the face of storm events, may continue to serve its region for the
following goals: facilitating trade as a conduit for the exchange of resources, materials, and
finished products; facilitating business success and profit to firms; an engine for local, state,
and/or national economic growth and stability; and a public good that minimizes environmental
harm and contributes to residents’ quality of life. Actors may share these goals, but prioritize
them differently, as different types of stakeholders have widely varying interests in the port.
Since a port serves a diverse community of stakeholders and society at large, port resilience may
also be considered as a public good from which all stakeholders may benefit. This concept
underlies the value of considering all stakeholders’ perspectives when assessing impacts of storm
events and strategies to build resilience. A public good is both non-excludable and nonrivalrous, since individuals cannot be effectively excluded from its benefit, and the benefit by
one individual does not reduce the benefit to others (Besanko and Braeutigam 2010). Egli (2012)
shows how- on a national scale- the U.S. benefits from strengthening the Nation’s awareness and
inter-agency coordination around the public good aspects of infrastructure resilience. Although
little research has been conducted on this particular aspect of seaport storm resilience, in which
the seaport is considered a public good, some insights can be obtained from similar work that
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focused on port security, that underscore the value that planning for the long-term functioning of
seaports can have for all stakeholders. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, much attention has been
paid to the role of seaports play in such attacks. Haveman and Shatz (2006) suggest that the loss
of port functionality due to these external strikes can result in a cascade of impacts on supply
chains, port-dependent businesses and consumers who rely on the goods and materials handled
by the port. For the same reason national defense has been identified as a public good that
prevents these cascading impacts, seaport storm resilience may be considered a worthy goal,
since similar outcomes can occur from the impact of a major storm hitting a port. Some of these
impacts are quantifiable in economic terms, while others have intangible consequences on
quality of life or the environment. Since stakeholders of a port may be expected to bear some of
the costs associated with a hurricane strike, understanding the impacts and resilience strategies
available, can lead to benefits for the port and the port stakeholders.
2.4.

Stakeholders	
  of	
  the	
  port	
  

Scholars and policy makers have stressed the importance of identifying stakeholders (Bryson
2004) and including a broad range of stakeholders' perspectives in developing adaptive responses
to climate change (Few et al. 2007) and for transport planning in particular (Ward 2001). The
primary function of a port is the transfer of cargo and/or passengers between a waterway and the
shore (Talley 2009), but today’s ports are more than simply a system of channels, wharves, and
multi-modal connections. Thus, the stakeholders who depend upon the port functionality are
diverse. Ports serve as profit centers for a variety of businesses, including shippers, shipping
agents, energy companies, importers and exporters, and port authorities. They facilitate the
transport of energy resources, building materials, finished products, and chemicals. Ports also
share ecologically sensitive territory with other stakeholders, such as commercial and
10

recreational users. Ports may also be considered a cultural element, embedded within and held
accountable for the goals of a larger society (Burroughs 2005).
Stakeholders of a port may be defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman 2010). As described by Notteboom
and Winkelman (2002), the principal stakeholders of the port include the port operator (often a
public port authority) and the firms that are directly engaged in the transfer of cargo or
passengers. However, many stakeholders of the port share a wide variety of goals and missions
with respect to the long-term functioning of the port, including business success, facilitating
trade, economic growth, and public goods and services. In a sense, stakeholders of a port may
include almost anybody (Mitchell et al. 1997), numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands or
more, -- if one includes all neighbors, residents depending on goods shipped through the port,
and the customers throughout a supply chain. However, climate adaptation and building
resilience to storm events at ports will most likely be carried out by those individuals and groups
who will be directly affected, and who may assume responsibility for implementing and
sustaining the adaptation measures over time (NRC 2010), thus for the purposes of this study, we
limit the stakeholders to the port stakeholder cluster discussed in the following section.
Though ports have been previously considered in academic research, most studies have confined
analysis to the port authority itself or to the supply chain, of which the port is one component
(Hall and Jacobs 2010; Goss 1990; Haezendonck 2001). However, as Hall and Jacobs (2007)
noted, numerous other organizations must be considered within the port context. Port systems
incorporate numerous independent firms and multi-modal transportation connections in order to
provide services that would lead to economic growth and stability to their regions. Due to the
complexity of port systems and the variety of ways that stakeholders depend upon port
11

functioning, a representative sampling of stakeholder concerns is necessary in order to develop a
richer picture of the impacts beyond the concerns addressed by port operators.
Strategic management scholars use cluster analysis to understand the “actors that can affect or
are affected by the achievement of a firm’s objectives” (Freeman 2010). Although clusters have
traditionally been defined as “spatially concentrated groups of firms competing in the same or
related industries, that are linked through vertical and horizontal relationships” (Porter 1998), De
Langen (2004) expanded this definition from “all economic activities related to the arrival of
goods and ships,” to include “populations consisting of business units, associations, and public or
private organizations”. Since de Langen employed the cluster concept as a lens through which
the economic performance of the port may be viewed, the actors that make up the cluster consist
primarily of firms. For the purposes of the present work, we expand the definition of cluster
further to place a greater emphasis on stakeholders who have interests beyond the profit motives
that drive the port-related firms.
Thus, the cluster in this research loosely binds the group of organizations that have a stake in the
long-term resilience of a port. Drawing absolute boundaries around this cluster is difficult or
impossible, due to the global nature of the transportation network in which ports participate.
Therefore, the port stakeholder cluster concept here includes the key stakeholders that have an
interest in the resilience of a port and can play some role in planning or decision-making.
The port stakeholder cluster (De Langen 2004; Haezendonck 2001) may be divided into two
primary categories: internal and external stakeholders (Figure 3). Those stakeholders that are part
of the port authority organization (e.g., the port operator, shareholders, managers, and
employees) may be considered as internal stakeholders and are generally most concerned with
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the return on investment, shareholder/stakeholder value and/or the creation of wealth. A diverse
array of actors and organizations fall into the broader category of external stakeholders.
Figure 3 -- Stakeholder cluster (Based on Notteboom and Winkelman, 2002)
These external stakeholders include economic/contractual stakeholders that are involved in
certain port operations such as stevedoring companies, shipping agencies, insurers, ship repair
services, port tenants, and the like. These stakeholders tend to have profit-oriented missions and
many have the agency to shift locations should a major storm strike at the port. For example, a
shipping company can divert its cargo to a different port in the event of a disaster at its original
destination.
Public policy stakeholders include government agencies responsible for transport and economic
affairs, as well as environmental agencies, planning departments, and emergency management
agencies. These can be local (e.g., city planning and zoning commissions), state (e.g., coastal
management programs and departments of transportation), and federal (e.g., the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). These
stakeholders have responsibility for facilitating commerce, protecting the environment, and other
aspects of public welfare.
Community/environmental stakeholders consist of community groups, neighboring residents, the
general (tax paying) public, environmental groups, and others. These types of groups typically
advocate on behalf of a particular cause (e.g., water quality) or population (e.g., a residential
neighborhood around a port). These community stakeholders may not always recognize their role
until some event brings their dependence on the port to their attention. This may include a
disaster at the port, plans for the development of port facilities, or a shift in the type of business
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being conducted at the port.
Though not explicitly included in Notteboom and Winkelmans' typology, academic research
stakeholders can also play a role in port planning development. These may include academic
organizations or non-governmental groups that conduct independent work or are contracted by
another stakeholder. Particularly with regard to resilience or economic development plans,
researchers can provide information to the port’s planning process. For example, weather
forecasting, climate projections, and economic models may be used to inform the decisionmaking process. In Providence, the University of Rhode Island’s (URI) Coastal Resources
Center provides facilitation and communication expertise that aids in the development of
statewide policy.
2.5.

Impacts	
  of	
  storm	
  events	
  at	
  ports	
  and	
  assessment	
  techniques	
  

Identifying the specific impacts serves as a first step toward adaptation, before strategies to
reduce (or transfer) risk and mitigate disasters can be identified, assessed, and selected (Moser
and Ekstrom 2010; NCADAC Draft; IPCC 2007). Many databases account for disaster losses
and numerous analyses have employed these databases to generate comparisons of risk on a
national or International scale (Allison et al. 2009; GCRP 2009; Hanson et al. 2010). One study,
the UNDP’s “Disaster Risk Index,” uses mortality data to create a quantitative measure that
allows for a comparison of risk levels of various hazards between countries (Peduzzi et al. 2009).
Another, called the “Hotspots Project,” developed a world map of hotspots that illustrates where
the risk of mortality and economic losses due to natural hazards is greatest (Birkmann 2007).
Depending on the database, losses are generally reported as direct monetary (observable damage
to infrastructure) and indirect losses (e.g., decline in revenue, business interruption). Some will
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also count these losses at the community, state, regional, or global levels, depending on the
nature and impact of the hazard event” (Gall et al. 2009).
Impact assessments conducted on a regional or national scale are often too general to capture the
unique ramifications felt by a given sector, like a particular port stakeholder cluster. Thus, there
are also many ways to categorize impacts on a local or regional scale. Short-term vs. long-term
costs, reported vs. unreported losses, breakdowns by “who pays,” and costs by geographic area
are but a few. The Heinz Center report, The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards (2000),
recommends a combination of quantitative estimates when data are available and qualitative
descriptions when they are not. It suggests breaking down costs by economic sectors such as:
housing, commercial and industrial property, or transportation infrastructure. However, as the
report points out, many of these costs are hidden and/or very difficult to quantify due to the lack
of data. Damage assessments, typically conducted on a particular property, focus on the actual
damages to the property, but do not account for the indirect costs and intangible consequences
resulting from that loss that impacts the broader community.
Impact assessment and risk identification methods typically do not allow for a detailed
understanding of how storms might impact clusters of stakeholders who depend on a given piece
of infrastructure, such as transportation, utilities, or seaports. Some assessments may be too
broad in geographic scale (Lian et al. 2007; Hallegatte 2008) to inform relevant local decision
makers, while others may focus on one projection of one particular cost, such as insured losses
(Grossi et al. 2005) or direct damage to structures (Curtis 2007; LADOT 2006). Further, many
traditional ways of assessing direct damages and indirect costs may only be applied post factum.
They are designed more for looking at “what happened” and using costs for repairs and
insurance claims to quantify damages. This case studies presented here provide the type of richer
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understanding of the full range of potential impacts that can lead to better resilience planning for
ports (Woodroffe 1990; IPCC 2012; Stern and Britain 2006).
2.5.1. Challenges	
  in	
  seaport	
  resilience	
  and	
  adaptation	
  planning	
  	
  
Due to the projected impacts of climate change, planning for seaport resilience has recently
emerged as a unique area of resilience research (McEvoy and Mullett 2013; EPA 2008; Becker
et al. 2013), in addition to a variety of other infrastructure sectors such as roads (NRA 2012),
airports (Baglin 2012), railways (Baker et al. 2010), and infrastructure as a general concern
(NIAC 2009). A new body of work has begun to address a need to shift planning paradigms to
include a range of incentives and more stakeholders in the process of creating more resilient
ports (Ng et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2013).
However, understanding the magnitude of port resilience issues is still in its infancy and the
scope of the problem for ports and port stakeholders is still not well understood. Little guidance
is available for incorporating long-term resilience (more than 20+ years out) in the port
infrastructure planning process in the U.S. or elsewhere in the world. Further, ports also fall
outside of the planning parameters that regulate other types of coastal uses. Ports are typically
zoned for industrial use and thus are not subject to many regulations that are designed to protect
the interests of residents. For example, U.S. Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management)
requires federal agencies to prevent long and short-term adverse impacts associated with the
occupancy and medication of flood plains, and to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain
development wherever there is a practicable alternative (FEMA 2013). However, since FEMA
considers ports to be functionally dependent infrastructure that must be located in a floodplain,
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requirements can often be relaxed for port infrastructure.1
The U.S. has no centralized authority that oversees investment or operation strategies for ports
that provides guidance or incentives for resilience planning. Further, oversight is more difficult,
due to the port ownership structure, which may be any combination of public and private,
ranging from those that are 100% privately owned and operated, to public/private partnerships,
to those that are 100% publicly owned and operated. Since the port operator has a direct interest
in the ongoing functioning of the port, one might expect to find storm resilience addressed in the
port’s strategic planning process, which for ports is typically based on the core mission and
principles of a port operator (Allen 2012). However, ports generally plan in accordance with
three time horizons that do not align well with climate change projections (Dooms et al. 2004):
Short-term planning covers a one-to-three year time span with a primary focus on operational
issues and current practical problems.
Medium-term planning covers three to five years and typically focuses on marketing and
financial goals.
Long-term planning typically covers a 10 to 25-year time horizon and focuses on the
development of the wider port area.
It is usually difficult for a port operator to develop concrete plans and strategies for infrastructure
development beyond 25 years, since too many assumptions would have to be made about factors
such as employment, cargo throughput, and technological advancements. Climate change, and
the accompanying increase in risk from extreme events, requires a longer planning horizon.
1

Note that this gap is being addressed in part through the recent Presidential Policy Directive 21 – Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience that establishes a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure,
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.
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Discussions with port planners have affirmed that resilience issues are not typically a part of the
strategic planning process (Pers. comm. Kiernan). This may be in part because of a lack of an
appropriate incentive structure. As stated by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council,
“Current market mechanisms may be inadequate to achieve the level of resilience needed to
ensure public health, safety, and security. Even with a strong business case, there are lowprobability, high-consequence events for which investments in resilience by private companies
cannot be justified” (NIAC 2009). To raise capital for expansion or improvements, ports rely on
a combination of their own profits and public assistance on an ad hoc basis (ASCE 2012).
However, even without factoring in climate change, a recent report projected a GDP loss of $697
billion by 2020 unless significant investments are made into the Nation’s marine transportation
system (ASCE 2012). Although climate change is already affecting some areas, noticeable
changes that will impact infrastructure are not likely to become evident for several decades from
the present (USCCSP 2008), a time horizon well outside of strategic planning processes designed
to maximize profit.
This section provided background on the key concepts that underlie this research. These concepts
include climate adaptation, seaport resilience, the stakeholder cluster, and impact assessments.
The next section provides the background and context for the case studies. It begins with an
overview of the reasons for selecting Gulfport and Providence as case studies. It then provides
background and context for each of the two ports. Finally, the methods used for interviews and
the documents selection, the creation of storm scenarios as a thought prompt, as well as the
analysis are described.
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3. Case	
  study	
  description	
  and	
  data	
  collection	
  methods	
  
This study considers two seaports that are highly exposed to hurricanes in which stakeholders
have been engaged in resilience planning (Figure 4). The Port of Gulfport (MS) recently
experienced the devastating consequences of Hurricane Katrina and has been in the process of
rebuilding. Providence (RI) has not had a major hurricane since 1954, but is similarly exposed to
potential storm surges in excess of 25’. The decision makers in Providence and statewide in
Rhode Island have been involved with two principal climate adaptation efforts: a new part of the
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program addressing adaptation to natural hazards;
and the formation of a Climate Change Commission. We undertook the case studies of these two
ports to focus on problem identification at the local level. Because our main interest and focus
was on questions about impacts and resilience, we selected these ports because of their high
exposure to hurricanes and because stakeholders were likely to be familiar with resilience
planning. Both ports are small to medium sized and provide jobs, goods, and services to their
local economies and communities.
Figure 4 -- Map of Gulfport and Providence
3.1.

Overview	
  of	
  Gulfport	
  

Gulfport, Mississippi, faced utter destruction from a 28’ storm surge during Hurricane Katrina.
Gulfport had recently adopted a plan to elevate the entire port from 10’ to 25’ as a strategy to
build the port’s resilience to Katrina-magnitude storms. This $140m investment in resilience was
unparalleled. No other port that we researched had considered such a drastic step toward storm
resilience. Thus, we selected Gulfport because we anticipated a high degree of awareness around
the impacts of hurricanes (due to the recent Katrina event) and the potential resilience-building
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strategies.
The Port of Gulfport (Figure 5) is Mississippi’s largest port and the third busiest container port
on the U.S. Gulf Coast. It imports fruit, garments, limonite ore, and hardwood lumber, and it
exports paper, cellulose, fabrics, and other products. Primarily a container port, Gulfport handled
216,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2011 (Table 1). A chief executive officer and
five port authority commissioners oversee the port operations under the auspices of The
Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) and the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport
(MSPA). The mission of the port is “to be a profitable, self-sufficient port providing world-class
maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate the economic growth
of Mississippi through the promotion of International trade and the creation of employment”
(PEER 2006)

Figure 5 -- Aerial view of Port of Gulfport (www.portofthefuture.com)
Table 1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics
Gulfport has been hit by 25 hurricanes since 1858, with 9 of them being major (i.e., Categories 3,
4, or 5) (Figure 6). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates a
return period of 11 years for a hurricane hitting Gulfport (Blake et al. 2011). The port is very
exposed to open water and sits in the hurricane “catcher’s mitt” of the Gulf Coast, where storms
tend to track after passing through the Gulf of Mexico.
Figure 6 -- Hurricane tracks near Gulfport
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm that brought storm
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surges of up to 30' to Gulfport (Fritz et al. 2008). Katrina devastated much of the Gulf Coast,
leaving almost 2000 people dead and causing $81B in damages (Knabb et al. 2005). In the City
of Gulfport, the surge flooded six to twelve miles inland (Fritz et al. 2008). Direct damages to the
port itself were estimated at over $50 million (Table 2). During that storm, gaming barges, a
gantry crane, and 430,000 square feet of warehouses and freezer facilities were demolished.
Another 400,000 square feet of enclosed warehouses, parking structures, and fill material were
severely damaged. The public at large experienced losses due to the direct impacts of the port’s
physical contents (containers, poultry, etc.) and also due to the indirect impacts of the port’s loss
of business and operational continuity. The loss of business continuity resulted in rising prices,
difficulty in obtaining materials, unemployment, and strain on other parts of the transportation
system. The loss of operational continuity left many important resources unavailable. For
example, the	
   severe	
   damage	
   to	
   Gulfport	
   resulted	
   in	
   regional	
   shortage	
   of	
   tropical	
   fruits,	
  
because	
  major	
  fruit	
  importers	
  such	
  as	
  Dole,	
  Chiquita,	
  and	
  Crowley	
  were	
  forced	
  to	
  reroute	
  
shipments	
   to	
   Port	
   Everglades,	
   FL,	
   or	
   Freeport,	
   TX,	
   at	
   extra	
   expense	
   (USCCSP	
   2008;	
  
Grenzeback	
  and	
  Andrew).	
  The local and regional economy suffered when the operations at the
port shut down after Katrina due to the loss of jobs, taxes, and an increase in prices.
Table 2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006)
3.1.1. The	
  plan	
  for	
  restoration	
  of	
  The	
  Port	
  of	
  Gulfport	
  
After Katrina, the MSPA, Governor Haley Barbour, and the MDA weighed options for
developing a more resilient port, ultimately choosing a strategy to elevate the port (see Table 3).
However, the roots of this plan lay in a pre-existing master planning effort to expand the port in
anticipation of new business that would come from the widening of the Panama Canal. Before

21

Katrina, the MSPA had already initiated an 84-acre port expansion program. 60 acres of the
Mississippi Sound had been filled in before Katrina hit, leaving an additional 24 acres still to fill.
This expansion plan was to be funded entirely through state bonds and port revenue and would
increase business opportunities for the port. After Katrina, the Governor charged the MSPA with
the task of developing a new strategy for resilience and the MDA with managing the funding of
the project. The MSPA hired the JWD Group, an engineering consulting firm, to revise a 2003
master plan that addressed new development opportunities for both maritime and non-maritime
uses in downtown Gulfport. The new revised plan also incorporated resilience measures that
piggybacked on a pre-existing inland port distribution-center concept; at a cost of approximately
$130m, an inland port three miles from the coast would also serve as a freight evacuation depot
under any significant hurricane threat. Though this evacuation plan was incorporated in the 2007
Master Plan Update, it included no explicit discussion of future hurricane risk, or about the
importance of storm resilience at the port itself. A detailed visioning section focuses only on
land-use goals and port expansion (MSPA 2007).
Table 3 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport
After completing the 2007 Master Plan Update, the MSPA contracted CH2M Hill, an
engineering consulting firm, to implement and manage the project, which began with a review
and comment of the updated plan. CH2M Hill found that the evacuation plan was, “an enterprise
limiting constraint, as well as an unquantifiable business risk to potential facility users. To put all
containers at an off-site location increases the cost of shipping, thereby making the Port of
Gulfport less attractive and less competitive to maritime carriers” (CH2M Hill 2010). CH2M Hill
recommended a radically different approach. Rather than relying on a plan to evacuate the port
every time a hurricane approached the Gulf Coast, they suggested elevating the entire port from
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10' above sea level to a 25' above sea level. The Governor and MSPA agreed and the MSPA and
MDA undertook a revision of the project’s Environmental Assessment Report to include the new
elevation strategy.
In their plan, they stated two main reasons for the new elevation plan:
1. To protect facilities, equipment and cargo against storm surge;
2. To minimize disruptions to the Port tenants by eliminating the need to fully evacuate
the terminal in the event of an approaching storm.
This improvement to the Port’s facilities would serve as a benefit and potential lure for new
customers. No other port on the Gulf Coast offers such hurricane surge protection (CH2M Hill
2010). CH2M Hill and MSPA convened a “council of experts” to assess the design feasibility of
raising the container laydown area, while keeping the ship loading/off-loading at its current
elevation, ultimately proposing a series of ramps between the two heights. CH2M Hill estimated
the cost of elevating 140 acres from 10' to 15' to be approximately $140m, or $1m/acre (CH2M
Hill 2010). Through the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
State of Mississippi applied for and received a “Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
Disaster Recovery Program” grant in the amount of $621m to “rebuild and restore the damage to
its facilities caused by Hurricane Katrina. The allocated funds would assist in providing
mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in
Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port” (MD
2011).
Once the decision to elevate the port had been made, an Environmental Assessment Report (EA),
as required by HUD, became the main mechanism for ensuring organizational checks, balances,
and involvement in the project. Since HUD provided the bulk of the funding, it served as the lead
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organization for the environmental review process. However, the MDA served as the
“responsible entity” and prepared the EA, together with the MSPA. The EA process required the
input of numerous other agencies (Table 4). However, the EA did not require any specific
external review of the port elevation component of the project.

Table 4 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port
restoration
The MSPA planned to complete the “Restoration Program” project by 2017, but in 2012 decided
to significantly downscale the elevation component of the plan in order to bring the port back
online more quickly. As of the writing of this paper, the MSPA was weighing “no additional
elevation” vs. “additional two-to-four foot elevation” alternatives (MSPA 2012).
3.2.

Overview	
  of	
  Providence	
  

At the time this research was conducted, the Port of Providence, a private service port (For a
discussion of types of ports, see PPIAF 2013), supplied a large part of Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island states with petroleum products and handled bulk and breakbulk imports and exports. Home heating oil, jet fuel, diesel, and other petroleum products were
imported through Providence Harbor. Numerous ancillary businesses also depended on the port’s
functionality, including: trucking companies, rail service, manufacturing companies, ship repair
facilities, marine pilots, and dredging companies, and even the State’s airport, which depended
on the port for jet fuel. The Port also sat at the head of Narragansett Bay, an ecologically
sensitive estuary that provides breeding grounds for marine life in the region. 105 acres of port
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lands were owned by the City of Providence and operated by a five board member nonprofit
organization, ProvPort. However, ProvPort leased the land to and contracted the services of
Waterson Terminals LLC, to operate and maintain the port. However, the full area of the Port of
Providence comprises a number of other waterfront businesses and industries, which together,
took up nearly 230 acres of waterfront (Becker et al. 2010). In 2010, the Port of Providence
handled approximately 3.1 million tons of cargo. ProvPort generated more than $200 million in
economic benefits for the region and over 2,400 jobs were attributed to port activities (PWWA
2010). ProvPort itself handled a variety of products, including scrap metal, wood products, coal,
salt, cement, and chemicals. There was no official port authority in Rhode Island and the State
played no direct role in port operations, though the state’s coastal agency does regulate land use
in the coastal area that the port occupies.
For the purpose of these case studies, we consider the “port” to encompass the entire port district
(Figure 7), even though Waterson Terminal Services is referred to as the Internal Port
Stakeholder for the purposes of this research. Since Rhode Island had no official port authority
that oversees operations or the development of the port area in Providence, there was no
centralized planning body that considered storm resilience issues. Even though Waterson
Terminal Services oversaw the operation, maintenance, and planning for the terminals of
ProvPort, they functioned more autonomously than a port authority, such as the one in
Mississippi.
Figure 7 -- Providence Harbor and its water dependent uses (Becker et al. 2010)	
  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considers Providence to be the “Achilles
heel of the Northeast” due to its position at the head of Narragansett Bay (Rubinoff 2007). For
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context, before Hurricane Katrina caused $80 billion in damages to the Gulf Coast, FEMA
considered New Orleans to be the Achilles heel of that region. Rhode Island had been hit by nine
hurricanes, two of them major, since 1900 (Figure 8). The length and orientation of Rhode
Island’s Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic hurricane zone, make it susceptible
to extreme storm surges from the southerly winds that are generated when a hurricane passes to
the west of the Bay. The U.S. Geological Survey currently considers the probability of a storm
hitting this area as “low” (Rubinoff 2007). A recent study estimates the hurricane return period
for Rhode Island to be 24 years, with the “major” hurricane return period of 94 years based on
historical data (USGS 2010). The Bay had not experienced a significant hurricane since
Hurricane Carol in 1954, which produced 14.5’ of storm surge. Models for hurricane effects in
Providence projected storm surges of over 20’, but these do not include climate change
projections for sea level rise or the intensification of hurricanes (Blake et al. 2011). Most of the
port lands are 3-10’ above mean high water. There is a hurricane barrier in place, but the barrier
is north of the port and could cause higher storm-surge levels at the port, as surge waters would
accumulate in Providence Harbor instead of spreading throughout the low-lying region now
protected behind the barrier.
Figure 8 -- Providence and history	
  of	
  storm	
  tracks
3.2.1. Adaptation	
  planning	
  in	
  Rhode	
  Island	
  
As we began this research, Rhode Island was in the midst of undertaking adaptation planning
efforts for the State. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), together with the
Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the University of Rhode Island (URI), had been drafting new
sea level rise policies and a new Hazards Chapter for the State’s Coastal Resources Management
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Plan. These policies provide broad guidance for adapting to new sea level rise, including
recommendations for altering building codes. The Climate Risk Reduction Act of 2010 (RIGL
23-84) established a new Rhode Island Climate Change Commission (RICCC 2012), with a
mandate to study the potential impacts of climate change in the State, and identify methods to
adapt to these changes in order to reduce harm and increase economic and ecosystem
sustainability. The RICC would also identify ways that adaptation could be mainstreamed into
existing state and municipal programs (e.g., policies, plans, infrastructure development). At the
time we conducted interviews, this Commission had not yet convened. In Rhode Island, planning
efforts such as these often involve a relatively small pool of decision makers, as Rhode Island is
a very small state. The lead author’s experience working on such planning and policy efforts in
the state indicated that many stakeholders of the port cluster would also have some awareness or
involvement in these planning efforts.
3.3.

	
  Data	
  collection	
  and	
  interview	
  methods	
  

The case studies were designed to identify the ways in which port stakeholders perceive the
impacts of a hurricane occurring at the port, the ways that planning/policy addresses those
concerns, and the potential strategies for building port resilience.
These studies assessed two sources of information about impacts of a hurricane on the Port of
Providence, RI and Gulfport, RI: interviews that clarified the perceptions of port stakeholders
and policy documents that address storm issues at the port. The interviews of port stakeholders
show the concerns of stakeholders about potential impacts that may or may not be recognized
through the more formalized planning and policy-making process. The analysis of policy
documents reveals how decision makers formally recognize the potential impacts of a storm
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hitting the port. By utilizing both of these sources, a richer picture of the range of impacts and
strategies emerged, as well as indications of disconnects between the stakeholders' concerns and
the current policy.
We carried out surveys in these two ports over the summers of 2010 and 2011 during two visits
to the Port of Gulfport and three to the Port of Providence. During these visits, we conducted the
interviews of stakeholders, collected policy and planning documents, and visited the ports
themselves and other organizations where the interviews were conducted.
3.3.1. Selection	
  of	
  interviews	
  
For the purpose of this study, we consider the seaport stakeholders as a cluster that includes all
of the organizations that could or should play some role in the decision-making regarding longterm storm resilience for the port. We selected stakeholders using a snowball sampling approach
(Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012; Patton 2002) that resulted in an approximation of each of
the seaport clusters. Beginning with the port managers, we asked respondents:
What other organizations could play a role in port resilience planning, and to whom, in the
respective organizations, should we speak to about these issues?
As noted above, the stakeholder of the port could include every citizen in the State of Rhode
Island or Mississippi and beyond, and number in the hundreds of thousands. We thus limited the
cluster to those organizations that could play a role in resilience planning for the port, as
indicated by the stakeholders themselves. When no new names or organizations were added to
the suggested list by the interviewees and attempts had been made to interview the organizations
mentioned, the sample was deemed complete. Named individuals were contacted, given a brief
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explanation of the project, and subsequently interviewed. In almost all cases, the named
individual agreed to be interviewed or designated another individual within the organization who
did.
In Gulfport, the 30 interviewees included five internal port stakeholders, three external
economic/contractual stakeholders, nine federal public policy stakeholders, nine state public
policy stakeholders, three local public policy stakeholders, and one community group
stakeholder (Table 5). Both the MDA and MSPA were considered to be internal port
stakeholders, rather than state agencies, because both are directly involved in the port planning
and operations. The federal and state governments featured prominently, mostly because a state
port authority operates the Port and the Katrina rebuilding efforts depended on federal funding.
We were unable to interview representatives from the U.S. Customs, the State Senate, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and Kansas City Southern Railroad. Other interviewees
mentioned these stakeholders, but we were unable to identify a specific representative who could
speak to the issues of hurricane impacts to the port. No academic/research stakeholders were
suggested in Gulfport.
Table 5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport
In

Providence,
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interviewees	
   included	
   three	
   internal	
   port	
   stakeholders,	
   five	
  

economic/contractual	
  stakeholders,	
  one	
  community/environmental	
  group	
  stakeholder,	
  three	
  
academic/research	
   group stakeholders,	
   four	
   federal	
   public	
   policy	
   stakeholders,	
   eight	
   state	
  
public	
  policy	
  stakeholders,	
  and	
  three	
  local	
  government	
  public	
  policy	
  stakeholders	
  (Table 6).	
  
We	
  were	
  not	
  able	
  to	
  interview	
  representatives	
  of	
  the	
  Oil	
  Heat	
  Institute,	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  private	
  
companies	
  within	
  the	
  port	
  area,	
  or	
  the	
  Rhode	
  Island	
  Marine	
  Pilots	
  Association	
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Table 6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence
3.4.

Storm	
  scenarios	
  

In order to help interviewees think about storm events with respect to the port, we presented
respondents with a plausible, potentially catastrophic storm scenario as a visual prompt. This
scenario method has been successfully used in other studies on climate change to engage
stakeholder groups and inform policy makers (Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012). We created
storm scenarios together with Applied Science Associates (Rhode Island) who developed the
storm surge overlay for the visuals. Three students (Suejung Shin, Ernestine Fu, and Akshay
Adya) helped develop 3D models to represent the structures of (or in) the port. The resulting
visual scenario was a combination of a map of the port area, overlaid with a storm surge image,
equivalent to an approximately Cat 3 (Gulfport, see Figure 9) or Cat 4 (Providence, see Figure
10) hurricane, with an additional 1.6’ added for anticipated sea level rise. The scenario depicted a
map of the port area overlaid with the resulting storm surge. In Providence, this represents the
expected surge from a Category 3 hurricane that passes just west of Narragansett Bay, producing
approximately 26’ of surge.2 In Gulfport, this represents a Category 4 storm that produces
approximately 30’ of surge.
	
  
Figure 9 -- Port of Gulfport with simulated Category 4 storm surge
Figure 10 -- Port of Providence with simulated Category 3 storm surge

2

The surge heights were derived from NOAA’s Maximum of Maximum Envelope of High Water, which is
a worst-case scenario storm surge from a given hurricane. For more information, see
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ssurge/ssurge_momOverview.shtml. We added 0.5m (1.6’) of sea level rise, a low-end
projection for 2100.
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3.5.

Interviews	
  with	
  stakeholders	
  

We conducted semi-structured interviews individually as much as possible, though in some cases
two or three people attended an interview. In these cases, transcripts were coded to record the
responses from each individual separately. Interviewees were assured that their identities would
remain anonymous and that quotes from their responses would not be identified and attributed to
them individually. We designed a questionnaire using (Moser and Ekstrom 2010) as a template
(see Becker 2013) as it was also designed to interview stakeholders about plans and perceptions
around climate adaptation and resilience issues. Using the storm scenario as a thought prompt,
the purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit perceptions of storm impacts, current and potential
strategies for reducing port vulnerability to storms, perceptions of planning processes and
barriers to reducing vulnerability, and perceptions around climate change and climate change
adaptation. We tested the questionnaire through six mock interviews with fellow students and
experts in the field and revised questions that were unclear. The present study focuses on the first
two areas of inquiry in the questionnaire (impacts of storms and resilience strategies). Questions
probed the respondents’ perspectives on these issues, as well as on their management
responsibilities with respect to the port. For each of the 30 questions, we also provided potential
follow-up prompts to help generate further detailed discussion. Not all questions however, were
covered in each interview. Interviews focused on the subjects that matched the interviewees’
knowledge and expertise. Thus, questions not relevant to the interviewee were skipped.
Respondents were encouraged to think broadly about the port, the role it plays in the community,
and the full range of hurricane impacts and strategies that could build resilience, including both
short and long term possibilities that could be implemented by their own organization or others.
Respondents in both case studies discussed both the strategies that were already being followed
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and those that could be implemented in the future. If they had trouble responding to the
questions, some follow-up prompts were used to stimulate the conversation (refer to full
questionnaire in Becker 2013). Though it came up in interviews, we did not provide a definition
of resilience, thus allowing the interviewees to consider this concept in a way that was most
meaningful from their organization's perspective. In Gulfport, for instance, many respondents
referred back to their experience with Hurricane Katrina. Although five years had elapsed since
the storm and the interviews focused on hurricanes in general, Hurricane Katrina remained a
strong theme. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by either myself or through
a hired transcription service.
3.6.

Document	
  collection	
  

In order to examine how stakeholders' perceptions were reflected in formal port planning and
policy documents, we also examined the documents that address storm impacts and/or longrange resilience plans for the case study ports. We identified	
   planning	
   documents	
   for	
   the	
  
states	
   and	
   cities,	
   hazard	
   mitigation	
   plans,	
   storm	
   planning	
   documents	
   for	
   individual	
  
businesses,	
   economic	
   development	
   plans,	
   and	
   others	
   that	
   we	
   felt	
   might	
   possibly	
   include	
  
references	
   to	
   port	
   resilience	
   planning	
   or	
   the	
   impacts	
   of	
   hurricanes	
   on	
   the	
   Port.	
   Through	
  
web searches and suggestions received from the stakeholders during the interviews and through
follow-up requests, we examined the 16 documents from Providence and 32 from Gulfport that
we expected might address storm impacts and/or long-range resilience plans for the port. We
searched the collected documents for the following keywords: “[name of the case study port]”
and “port or seaport or ‘maritime infrastructure’” and “hurricane or storm or hazard.” We
eliminated documents if they did not address these search terms, were not officially
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published/released, or were not policies actually in use by a port stakeholder.
Of the 32 documents collected and reviewed in Gulfport, 16 met the search criteria (Table 7).
These included numerous planning documents from the Mississippi State Port Authority
(MSPA), as the MSPA was in the process of an expansion and redevelopment process after
Katrina. We also reviewed hurricane plans, economic impact assessments for the port, the
testimony of Governor Haley Barbour in which he appealed for disaster recovery funding, and
the impact assessments for the region.
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Table 7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport
Of the 16 documents collected and reviewed in Providence, six met the search criteria (Table 8).
The Port itself had no documents that specifically addressed storm resilience, outside of a
hurricane plan that we were not able to review formally. Interviewees, however, described this as
a standard operating procedure for securing the port facility in advance of a storm and not a longterm planning document. Representatives from the port informed me that planning was generally
completed on a task basis and contracted out to consultants, thus there was no master plan or
strategic plan for the port. The most detailed of the plans in Providence, is the Hazards Chapter
draft that would ultimately be a part of the Coastal Resources Management Program. This plan
also drew from a student report on debris that had been conducted at URI (Spaulding et al.
2007). We did not include this student report in the analysis, as it was not an official
planning/policy document.
Table 8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence
3.7.

Coding	
  method	
  

Following transcription, the interviews and documents were coded and analyzed using the
NVivo qualitative data analysis software package. The analysis used an analytic induction
method described by Ratcliff (1994) as an iterative process that allows for themes and ideas to
become evident through the coding process, also allowing for the modification of concepts. An
example of this process, in this case for coding impacts of a hurricane event in Providence, is
shown in Figure 11. The following steps summarize the coding process:
1. Line by line review. In total, 955 pages of interview transcripts from Gulfport and
Providence were reviewed line by line. Planning and policy documents were reviewed
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through the use of key word searches for relevant content (e.g., storm, hurricane, impact,
damage, port, etc.) and a review of the pages surrounding these key words.
2. Identification of the idea to be coded (e.g., impact or strategy mentioned). A first round
of coding was performed on transcripts and documents to identify initial impacts and
strategies (Charmaz 2006). Key phrases and ideas were tagged, grouped, and ultimately
distributed into broad categories and more specific subcategories.
3. Creation of key phrase to group main ideas. A second round of coding was conducted
with more attention to details and resulted in a variety of subcategories for both impacts
and strategies.
4. Creation of subcategories to group main ideas identified in Step 3.
5. Group into main categories.
Figure 11 -- Method of coding	
  
As we developed subcategories, we continued to review the transcripts to ensure that all relevant
ideas were captured and categorized appropriately. Coding was an iterative process and
ultimately the documents and transcripts were reviewed numerous times. An inductive approach
was used to create the subcategories, followed by a deductive approach to group them into three
main impact categories described in detail below.
3.8.

Three	
  impact	
  types	
  	
  

The results of the interviews and documents were coded and bundled into the impacts categories
defined by the IPCC. We use the IPCC’s (2012) definition of impact as an umbrella term to
capture both the direct damage to a given port facility as well as the various indirect costs and
intangible consequences (economic or otherwise) of that damage (Figure 12). Thus, impacts
include three main subcategories, as follows:
Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct
result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property.
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Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value
added” (Hallegatte 2008). These include losses associated with the disaster that occur in the
weeks, months, or years following the event. They also include losses or gains in wages, changes
in profits, and decrease or increase in production. Models that quantify indirect costs often use
industry input/output tables, but since they rely on regional data, the technique is difficult to
apply to one specific facility, like the port (Cochrane 2004).
Finally, intangible consequences include many non-market consequences of disasters. Examples
include: loss of life, health impacts, ecosystem damages, and damages to historical and cultural
assets. These consequences of the disaster, sometimes called high-order losses (Rose 2004) or
hidden costs (Heinz Center 2000) are very difficult to characterize and quantify as there are often
no economic measures available for evaluation.
Naturally, some impacts have a cascading effect. For example, damage to a crane (direct
damage) can result in expenses from cargo being re-routed (indirect cost) and/or that cargo being
unavailable to consumers in the short term (intangible consequence).
Figure 12 -- Hurricane impacts on port stakeholders
Every attempt was made to assign each “impact mention” to a single “impact type” and category.
This proved to be straightforward when interviewees were explicit about a given impact. In some
instances, however, an “impact mention” fell into multiple “impact types.” For example, a
mention of shipping containers being washed up throughout the City has a quantifiable indirect
cost element (e.g., a fixed cost to remove a container from a residential property) and an
unquantifiable intangible consequence impact (e.g., psychological ramifications of a resident
living with a shipping container on their front lawn). When not explicit, we based coding on our
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best interpretation given the context. We aimed to be as specific as possible about given impacts
and thus allowed some impacts that might be conducive to grouping to remain distinct and
separate. For example, a subcategory of Disruption of critical services, could have captured the
following more specific items: Destruction of energy infrastructure, Disruption of regional
energy distribution, Interruption of critical goods supply, Interruption of essential services, and
Interruption of power supply. However, our intention was to allow this to be a fine-grained
analysis, thus we kept these somewhat similar impacts distinct.
For each impact, we also assessed whether the cost would likely fall upon the “internal
stakeholder” (i.e., the port operator) or the “external stakeholders” (i.e., one or more of the other
stakeholders that make up the cluster) or both. The purpose of this cost assessment was to
examine how the range of impacts distributes across the stakeholder cluster. We assessed cost
burdens based on the management responsibilities described by respondents in interviews, as
well as a review of organizational mission statements, jurisdictions and mandates (Becker 2013).
We use the concept of “bearing the cost” broadly, as some costs may be easily determined (e.g.,
the cost to repair a structure), while others may be more difficult (e.g., cost of lost business), or
not easily quantifiable in economic terms at all (e.g., environmental costs of an oil spill). Though
this is a subjective exercise, it offers an initial assessment of how these impacts are distributed
across the stakeholder network. Finally, we noted which impacts were mentioned in interviews
and which were mentioned in documents in order to examine how the impacts were addressed
through planning and policy (for more on stakeholders interviewed and documents reviewed, see
Becker 2013).
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4. Results	
  
The preceding section set the stage for the analysis of interviews and documents. Next we
discuss the results for each of the three categories of stakeholders and how the costs distribute
across the cluster. We first provide an overview of the results in aggregate and then details for
each of the three broad impact types with examples from Gulfport and then from Providence.
In total, we identified 106 distinct impacts through our review of all 57 interview transcripts and
22 planning/policy documents (Figure 13). Through the analysis of 30 interview transcripts and
16 document reviews in Gulfport, we found 253 total “mentions” of 78 distinct impacts. In the
analysis of the 27 interviews transcripts and six documents in Providence, we found 138 total
mentions that we grouped into 46 distinct impact types. The highest number fell into the
“intangible consequences” category, followed by “direct damages,” and finally “indirect costs.”
Figure 13 -- Unique impacts mentioned in Gulfport and Providence
In each of the three sections below, a table depicts the unique impacts mentioned. For each case
study, these tables show from which type of data source the impact was mentioned, as follows:
Impacts mentioned in interviews only show an “I,” those found only in documents show a “D,”
and those impacts mentioned in both documents AND interviews show a “B.” In this study, we
do not venture too deeply into the linkages between impacts, nor the specific cost amounts that
could arise should the event occur. However, we do also examine which stakeholders would
likely bear those costs in order to provide a frame of reference for which groups have the most to
lose. Cost burden for each stakeholder group, indicated by a “$” in the Table 9 and Table 10,
shows that there is likely a monetary cost for that particular stakeholder group. In Table 11, a
checkmark is used, as many of the costs associated with intangible consequences are difficult to
38

monetize.
4.1.

Direct	
  damages	
  	
  

Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct
result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property. These are shown in detail
in Table 9.
Table 9 -- Table of direct damages
4.1.1. 	
  Gulfport	
  direct	
  damages	
  
The interviews and documents from Gulfport combined contained 128 total mentions of 30
unique direct damages. These include many damages experienced at the port itself, as well as
damages to the surrounding area that result from events at the port. Though interviewees were
provided with the future storm scenario, they tended to refer back to their experience with
Katrina. Thus, most of the direct damages mentioned were descriptions of actual events, rather
than perceptions about what could happen during the next event. Many direct damages also
result in downstream indirect costs and intangible consequences, which will be addressed in
subsequent sections, as tracing those pathways in detail was beyond the scope of this study.
In interviews, many respondents focused on Damage caused by debris off port property, which
refers to the containers and cargo that were washed off port property during Katrina. Twelve of
the interviewees talked about these issues in terms of the direct damage associated with debris.
Some aspects of this debris problem are easily quantified in monetary terms, such as the cost of
cleanup or the damage to a building caused by a piece of debris. However, as subsequent
sections will show, the impacts of debris are cross cutting and also include indirect costs, and
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intangible consequences. Some debris damaged the port itself, but much of it originated from the
port and resulted in other types of impacts throughout the city. Interviewees described how,
during Katrina, the storm surge completely submerged the port, containers floated freely,
industrial rolls of paper ended up on the second story of the parking garage, warehouse contents
were scattered throughout the surrounding neighborhoods, and the structures on the port itself
suffered enormous damages due in part to debris. Shipping containers in particular caused
extensive damage. One respondent described containers surfing down the faces of waves, and
“flying into neighborhoods, breaking up houses that may have been repairable from flooding
alone, but instead were just pulverized.”
Nine respondents, most from the port or port businesses, also recounted a variety of direct
damages to port property itself, including gantry cranes, warehouses, piers, and utility lines that
Katrina completely destroyed:

[The port] was flattened. There was nothing here. Our berth collapsed . . . Eight
weeks later, the channel was okayed [and] later they finally brought a ship in, but
it was of course restricted to daylight only ... The infrastructure was completely
gone.
Direct damages to freight and cargo referred to cargo and freight, but interviewees spoke about
it more as a cause of damage (as debris) than as a loss in and of itself. In the context of the level
of damage and costs of cleanup, the monetary loss associated with a cargo of poultry products or
some industrial rolls of paper was probably quite minor and likely covered by insurance. Like all
ports, Gulfport depends on a transportation network that includes road and rail. Though two of
the documents reviewed mentioned general damage to the on-port rail lines, interviewees did not
discuss damages to road and rail specifically. However, we were not able to speak with a
representative from the Kansas Southern Rail Company.
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The planning and policy documents we analyzed focused on direct damages at the port in great
detail. A damage assessment undertaken by the Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA)
consisted of an extensive survey of the port property conducted after Katrina, that assessed the
level of damage to all buildings, piers, wharves, and equipment at the port (MSPA 2005). The
repair and rebuild estimates from this assessment were used both for insurance claim purposes
and as a work list for the MSPA. The report notes 22 unique damages to the eastern and western
piers. Items included debris fields under the piers, building foundation damages, building topside
damages, total destruction of buildings, damage to railways, and damage to utilities.
The costs of repairs for direct damages fall primarily upon the internal port stakeholders, though
many such costs will also be paid by the economic/contractual stakeholders who conduct direct
business with the port. Port tenants, for example, could bear the costs of repairs to their buildings
and equipment, utilities (e.g., the cost to replace electric service to refrigerated storage
containers), or damage resulting from flooding. Many of these direct damage costs result from
repairs and cleanup. In the case of Katrina, the port tenants and insurance companies paid for
some of the damages mentioned, though interviewees did not discuss specifics. In addition, the
Federal Government provided funding for both repair and rebuilding/expansion of the port
through both FEMA ($60 million) and Community Development Block Grant funds
(approximately $560 million). Numerous indirect costs and intangible consequences, however,
also result from these direct damages. Those are discussed in the following sections.
4.1.2. Providence	
  direct	
  damages	
  	
  
In Providence, a total of 15 distinct direct damages were mentioned cumulatively in interviews
and in the planning and policy documents. Twelve of these were mentioned in interviews, but
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only three were mentioned in the planning and policy documents.
Most of the impacts mentioned in Providence referred to potential damages to port property,
either to structures or equipment or to the wharves and berths at the port. The petroleum fuel
tanks located in the port area stood out as a major concern amongst those interviewed. Concerns
about the tanks included damage to the tanks themselves, spills, and even the possibility that
with enough storm surge, the tanks might float off their bases. These damages to tanks could
have major repercussions for the region, as they could also result in both indirect costs (e.g.,
cleanup costs) and intangible consequences (e.g., environmental harm from fuel spillage). One
respondent illustrated his concern by telling an anecdote about the last major storm some 55
years before:

We’ve got big time problems down in the port as far as hazards are concerned. In
1954 we had hurricane Carol come through here … petroleum tanks went floating
down Narragansett Bay because the storm surge that came up flooded out the low
lying areas of the port.
Almost all of these direct damages would likely result in some or all of the costs being borne by
the port itself, though others, such as damage to vessels and barges would likely be covered by
external stakeholders, mainly grouped in two categories: the economic/contractual stakeholders
who are tenants at the port and the stakeholders who do business directly with the port (e.g.,
insurance companies, shipping companies, rail lines). Many such damages would likely be
covered through insurance policies, unless the damage far exceeded the amount covered,
however we were not able to review the specific insurance policies to ascertain which specific
damage items would be covered. The Federal Government, through disaster relief funds would
also likely cover some cleanup and rebuilding costs. Other stakeholder in the cluster, such as the
local public policy makers and the community groups, would probably not be responsible for the
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costs associated with direct damages. Although most costs associated with direct damages would
fall primarily upon the internal port stakeholders, many indirect costs and intangible
consequence costs that result from these direct damages would be shouldered by external
stakeholders, as shown in the subsequent sections.
4.2.

Indirect	
  costs	
  	
  

Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value
added” (Hallegatte 2008). These impacts could be quantified in economic terms, although special
models or techniques would be required to do so. Table 10 details these unique impacts.
Table 10 -- Table of indirect costs
4.2.1. Gulfport	
  indirect	
  costs	
  
Interviewees and documents in Gulfport mentioned 18 distinct impacts (for a total of 49 total
mentions) that we classified as “indirect costs.”
Lost business for ports and port tenants was mentioned 15 times in the documents reviewed and
7 times in interviews. The interviews mentioned that many businesses in Gulfport suffered or
even failed due to Katrina and that five years after Katrina, the Port of Gulfport still operated at
about 80% of its pre-Katrina business. Two major clients had shut down their operations at the
port and at least one was still operating, out of a temporary facility on the grounds of the port.
After Katrina, ports that were less damaged and less vulnerable were appealing to shippers that
had been long established in Gulfport. As one official put it:

You can rest assured these other ports were running around trying to get our
business. They knew we were suffering; and I can promise you they were knocking
43

on each one of these guys’ doors down here trying to get them to come to their
ports. It’s just the nature of the business.
Delays in port-related commerce and increased prices were discussed by several interviewees,
but were mentioned only twice in the port’s planning and operations documents. Business
interruptions occur in many sectors after a storm, but the port firms play an especially important
role in the process of rebuilding communities: Since rebuilding and restoring a sense of normalcy
depend heavily on the movement of materials, the lost business in and around the port can result
in shortages of necessary supplies.
In reviewing the port planning and operations documents, we found no calculations and little
explicit quantification of these indirect impacts even when the impact itself was mentioned. One
exception was in the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) report which cited a loss of
“about 1,200 port-related jobs (direct, indirect, and induced)” over the two years following
Hurricane Katrina (MDA 2011). We were not able to ascertain the methodology used to develop
these job-loss numbers. MDA also reported port revenue falling significantly from about
$20m/year in the years preceding Katrina (combined maritime and non-maritime) to about
$9m/year in the two years following. These indirect costs fall upon the internal port stakeholders
and many others within the stakeholder cluster. Indeed, determining who exactly will pay for
these is difficult to ascertain. Interviewees also mentioned one positive-spillover effect:
rebuilding can stimulate the economy.
Impacts such as lost business for port and port tenants can affect all stakeholders of the cluster:
e.g., internal stakeholders lose lease revenues, economic/contractual stakeholders lose profit, the
public loses the services provided by the individual businesses and potential jobs that are
associated with those businesses. Delays in port-related commerce and increased profits affect
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stakeholders in a similar way. Either the state or the economic/contractual stakeholders, along
with the port operator, would often pay many of the costs associated with cleanup. The one
positive-spillover impact noted by interviewees could benefit a number of stakeholders. Since
cleanup and rebuilding stimulates the economy, the port, the economic/contractual stakeholders,
and the public sector all stand to gain in some ways from a disaster, as well. For example, new
jobs can be created in the construction sector and federal funding (e.g., FEMA and HUD grants)
can benefit local workers and businesses.
4.2.2. Providence	
  indirect	
  costs	
  
In Providence, we identified seven distinct types of indirect costs, including one positive
spillover. All seven were mentioned in interviews, but only one General business continuity
problems was mentioned in the documents we reviewed. Other indirect costs included cleanup,
emergency response, and emergency services costs associated with cleanup and re-opening the
navigation channel, as well as costs associated with delays in port-related commerce, such as
business losses that would result from port businesses being shut down after the storm.
Unlike the direct damages, which would most likely be paid by the internal port stakeholders,
external stakeholders would likely pay for many of the indirect costs. The result of a shutdown of
the port or an important navigational channel for example (e.g., cleanup costs or costs to survey
the channel), might be paid for through tax revenues or business losses experienced by port
tenants and other external contractors. Cleanup and emergency service costs would likely be
covered by the public agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA), or the City of Providence. The
State would also need to hire emergency relief workers, a cost not currently included in its
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budget, according to one state representative.
4.3.

Intangible	
  Consequences	
  

Intangible consequences is the broadest category. It captures a wide range of impacts, many of
which occur in the months and years following the event itself. Many of these are many nonmarket consequences, which are very difficult to monetize, as there are often no economic
measures available for evaluation. Table 11 shows the intangible consequences found in the two
case studies.
Table 11 -- Table of intangible consequences
4.3.1. Gulfport	
  intangible	
  consequences	
  
In Gulfport, we found 46 unique intangible consequences in interviews and documents
combined. Many of the stakeholders focused on the many consequences of the debris resulting
from Hurricane Katrina, including: the stench, the health hazards, and the difficulty of cleanup.
For weeks after the storm, neither the MSPA, nor the tenants or the City addressed this problem.
This debris resulted in many secondary impacts that were very difficult to monetize, yet were
significant to the community. One interviewee, for example, indicated that salmonella from the
rotting carcasses had made its way into the soil on homeowner’s properties. In addition to the
items that washed up on private property, debris ended up in the waterway, causing both
environmental and navigation issues. As stated in one interview: The water comes up, it moves
into the coastal areas, and then when it’s retreating back to the ocean it’s pulling [all kinds of
materials back], so going back [later] to do dredging work, you’ve got these [residual] issues
from debris.
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Debris is especially problematic because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility for damages
and cleanup. For example, if a shipping container floats free and causes a breach in a petroleum
tank, which organization bears responsibility? The owner or insurer of the container? The
longshoreman who secured the containers? The owner of the petroleum tank? According to the
interviewees, the organizations in Gulfport litigated for years over these kinds of issues. After
Katrina, there were more than 50 claims of this nature. As one respondent described it: People
[were] real pissed off about chickens being in their yard. It was crazy to blame and sue the port
because they weren’t even their chickens; they belonged to the shipping company.
Interviewees described many other impacts that would be very difficult to quantify in economic
terms. In the aftermath of Katrina, the costs of insurance policies rose, certain risks became
uninsurable, and moratoriums were placed on new policies. Though aspects of these impacts
may be quantifiable, many are not. For example, it is difficult to say how the inability to insure
against future risk affects a business: Would the business operate anyway if authorized by its
financial backers? Would it change its operations in some way? Would it move its operations?
As one Gulfport respondent said, [Without insurance], the whole economy was going to come to
a frigging halt. Because if you can’t insure it you can’t finance it, if you can’t finance it you
can’t build it.
Another intangible consequence results from the loss of use of the port due to damage. An
undamaged port can be an important resource for disaster recovery and response (Mileski and
Honeycutt 2013). It can serve as a staging ground for supplies, manpower, and equipment. While
not always defined as a “critical facility”, like a hospital or fire station, a port can be instrumental
in cleanup, recovery, and rebuilding. With roads and bridges closed, ports offer an alternative for
bringing in goods and relief workers. However, a port that is severely damaged will not be
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available to provide these services, as was the case in Gulfport after Katrina. One respondent
described how even after the channel was cleared, the port was not able to support disaster relief
ships because it had no water or sewer infrastructure.
After Katrina, a lack of available staff further hindered recovery resulting in another intangible
consequence: When people are trying to figure out their livelihoods and where they’re going to
live and everything, it’s kind of hard to have them working for you. These types of labor and
employment consequences impacted many individuals and businesses in the region. Some of the
port’s employees had no homes and prioritized finding a place for their families to live over
returning to work. Port officials also discussed how storms like Katrina could create additional
difficulties in port planning and development. Plans for growing the Port of Gulfport that had
taken years to develop had to be shelved and priorities reviewed after Katrina destroyed the port,
setting the port’s expansion timeline back by a considerable amount of time.
Respondents also talked about many issues that we categorized as general disruptions to a sense
of normalcy and the quality of life. Some of these, like disruptions of energy supply, can be
traced back to port uses (e.g., a damaged fuel terminal results in interruptions of fuel supply).
Interviewees indicated that normal life was disrupted for months or even years after Katrina as
residents worked to clean up and rebuild their homes and places of employment. Many
respondents also talked about environmental consequences such as household chemicals and
other materials that would end up in the waterway and marine sediment layer. Chemical
contamination harms marine life and results in higher costs for dredging, as special techniques
must be used to minimize contamination of the waterway and to dispose of toxic dredge spoils.
In this way, even waterway contamination that occurred from an off-port location would still
have an impact on port operations and costs since dredging is a requirement for ongoing
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operation of the port. As one respondent noted:

Ensuring that the sediments are suitable for ocean disposal, upland disposal, or
open water disposal becomes very costly as you may have [tested the sediment
and] initially started to dredge, [but then] if you have a storm you may have to go
right back and test it again, which could cost another $300,000 to $400,000.
Consequence for the local and regional economy from losing port functionality included a
variety of public sector concerns, as well as reductions in energy product imports and damages to
other infrastructure commonly found at or near the port. For example, respondents talked about
their experience trying to rebuild in a crippled local economy:

Immediately after Katrina, the infrastructure was not in place anymore to house
and feed workers and handle all the rebuilding … materials were scarce, because
everybody was fighting for a limited amount of building materials and products.
Salaries went way up because there was a limited work force … everybody was in
a bidding war for labor.
Public sector impacts such as fuel availability for generators and transportation, lack of boat
access to the navigational channel, and the costs of unemployment, all slowed down the recovery
process. Some aspects of these intangible consequences may be quantifiable. For example, lost
jobs in the labor and employment consequences subcategory may manifest as unemployment
insurance costs. Pollution to bay or waterway may also be quantified using specialized
techniques such as those used to value ecosystem services (Daily et al. 2009).
Generally speaking, the costs of intangible consequences that were identified through interviews
and documents were distributed across the stakeholder cluster. The internal port stakeholders feel
the effect of most of these, but most also can be felt in the budgets of public agencies and in, for
example, the quality of life of community members in the local region and the state.
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4.3.2. Providence	
  intangible	
  consequences	
  
The 24 intangible consequences found in Providence ranged from job losses, to disruptions in
energy and critical service supplies, to a whole host of potential environmental damages
resulting from spills originating at the port. Some aspects of these impacts may be quantifiable in
monetary terms (e.g., port facility closures do have a financial component, as well as other nonfinancial components), but many would be extremely difficult or even impossible to quantify in
financial terms. For example, the environmental damages resulting from coal, cement, or other
materials spilling into the waterway could have far-reaching implications for the whole
ecosystem of the Narragansett Bay. One respondent described these consequences, as follows:

You have liquid petroleum products, cement, [and] a chemical company all of
which are going to be submerged [and] subject to debris damage ... They’re all
going to be pulled right back into the Narragansett Bay, you’re going to have a
lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to
[comprehend].
Another respondent mentioned the intangible consequence of losing the port as a resource in
disaster recovery and response scenarios, since ports can serve as staging areas for response
efforts that aid in recovery. As discussed in the Gulfport section above, a severely damaged port
could result in a longer and more difficult recovery process period, affecting the region as a
whole (Spaulding et al. 2007; Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).
Six respondents also discussed impacts that fell into the broad category of general disruptions to
a sense of normalcy and the quality of life. Since the port provides essential services to the
region, losing port functionality results in disruptions of energy supplies and other materials that
can negatively impact overall quality of life (e.g., residents have no fuel for heating or driving)
and result in psychological stress (e.g., the shear scale of the disaster is overwhelming and leaves
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residents with a feeling of hopelessness). A very real example of this occurred after Hurricane
Sandy in New York/New Jersey when the damaged port infrastructure prevented necessary
petroleum products from getting to the New Jersey refineries. Queues at the gas pumps stretched
for miles and hours.
Debris was also cited numerous times, with some respondents describing debris that originated at
the port and impacted other parts of the Bay. Other respondents discussed the impact that debris
from elsewhere could have on port operations (e.g., debris could shut down the navigation
channel as discussed in the Indirect Costs section above). The numerous mentions of debris were
likely due in large part to a detailed study conducted by students at the University of Rhode
Island (Spaulding et al. 2007). Five of the respondents indicated that they had read this study.
We did not include the student report itself in our review of official planning and policy
documents, since it did not qualify as an official planning or policy document of any of the
stakeholders within the cluster. However, the “Hazards Chapter” of the Metro Bay Region
Special Area Management Plan referenced many of the specific debris concerns brought to light
in the student's report. In fact, of the 12 impacts we found mentioned in the Hazards Chapter,
eight referred specifically to debris.
All of the stakeholders in the port cluster would share to some extent in the costs associated with
these intangible impacts, though most of the costs burden would fall primarily upon external
stakeholders. For example, damage at the port prevents more efficient disaster response for
region, results from not having the port available as a resource for recovery: A functioning port
could serve as a landing area for barges that collect debris; U.S. Coast Guard vessels performing
survey work; a terminal for necessary fuel products,; among many other necessary functions. A
damaged port also could result in individual tenants within the port losing their insurance
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coverage, thus the service that those businesses supply (e.g., fuel supply, building materials,
scrap metal or debris export) would also be unavailable as resources to the overall cleanup effort.
The environmental damages, such as chemical spills or bulk materials washing into the
waterway, also result in costs that are difficult to quantify in monetary terms, but will ultimately
be borne by society as a whole. For example, pollution could make the bay unsuitable for
swimming or fishing and harm the sensitive marine environment that provides breeding areas for
many species that make up the marine ecosystem. The quality of life of residents in the City and
State could be affected by this type of pollution or other impacts, due to lost jobs, lack of access
to gasoline or heating oil, or simply due to the psychological effects resulting from a disaster that
destroys the port.

5. Discussion	
  
The preceding sections described the results from interviews and documents in both Gulfport and
Providence. Findings from each of the three broad categories of impacts were discussed, with
examples provided from each of the two case study locations. These results provide empirical
evidence for the vast range of impacts that can occur when a major hurricane hits a port, as well
as an assessment of which stakeholder groups would likely bear the costs (financial or otherwise)
for these different types of impacts. The next sections put these results into context. In Section
5.1, the three original research questions are discussed, with detail from each of the two case
studies locations provided in turn. We then provide some comparative analysis between these
two case studies in Section 5.2, with a focus on the similarities and differences and where results
might be more generalizable to other ports. In Section 5.3, we discuss some of the planning and
policy implications from these findings, with a particular focus on leadership issues, the use of
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qualitative assessments for policy, and some of the unique challenges of seaport resilience
planning. Finally, we address the limitations and next steps for this work.
5.1.

Summary	
  of	
  research	
  questions	
  findings	
  

In this section, we address the three research questions posed at the beginning of this paper for
each of the two case studies.
5.1.1. QUESTION	
  1:	
  How	
  do	
  port	
  stakeholders	
  in	
  Gulfport	
  (MS)	
  and	
  Providence	
  (RI)	
  perceive	
  
the	
  impacts	
  of	
  a	
  major	
  hurricane	
  hitting	
  the	
  port	
  

This question was designed to ascertain how different stakeholders think about a major hurricane
hitting the port. We did not set out to assess level of concern or priorities, rather we wanted to
provide a catalogue of impacts that could be further tested and assessed in future work. We also
analyzed how the different groups of stakeholders considered the impact types by averaging the
total number of impacts mentioned by respondents from each group. These results are depicted
in the radar plots in Figure 14 and Figure 15. We first discuss perceptions of stakeholders in
Gulfport and then Providence.
Perceptions of Stakeholders in Gulfport
Stakeholders interviewed from the Port of Gulfport consisted primarily of public agencies at
local, state, and federal levels (16 total), but also included economic/contractual firms in and
around the port itself (3). There were five port officials interviewed and one community group.
In sum, stakeholders mentioned more unique intangible consequences (28 total) than direct
damages (16 total) or indirect costs (13 total) Figure 14 shows the average number of impacts
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mentioned by interviewees from each of these five major parts of the port stakeholder cluster.
For example, on average internal port stakeholders (of which five were interviewed) mentioned
4.5 direct damages, 2.6 indirect impacts, and 3 intangible consequences each. This suggests that
these stakeholders, as a group, were fairly well balanced in how they considered the impacts
across the three broad categories. The other stakeholder groups all skewed toward more mentions
of intangible consequences, as opposed to direct damages or indirect costs. In interviews, port
officials showed a deep understanding of the variety of impacts, as well as the ripple effects that
these impacts can have. In fact, they had been dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina
for several years and working toward building a more storm resilient port. They discussed many
of the direct damages from Katrina, as well as the impacts on the economy and the surrounding
community. As we will see in Section 5.1.3, many of these concerns were not reflected explicitly
in the port’s plans and policies, but the representatives themselves had a very high level of
awareness around the various impacts of a storm like Katrina or the one depicted in the scenario
we provided.
Figure 14 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Gulfport)
As an aside, climate change will increase the probability of storms like Katrina in the coming
decades (Grinsted et al. 2013). Though we did not set out to interview stakeholders about climate
change specifically, many of them discussed climate change as they were answering questions
about how they perceive the impacts of potential storms. Respondents were fairly evenly split
between those who were and were not concerned about climate change impacts. One concerned
respondent stated:

[We] lack a look at sea level rise in the region. Not just for the Port of Gulfport,
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but for Harrison County. What is sea level rise going to do to the total
infrastructure of Harrison County? Well it’s going to totally destroy it…Raising
the port to 25’ elevation is stupid, because the surrounding land is not at 25’, and
they’re not going to raise all of Harrison County. So yeah, your containers will sit
there, but everything in them is going to rot because you’re not going to be able
to get them off the port … The way the area’s developed, you’d have to totally
destroy downtown Gulfport [in order to make the port] truly resistant to sea level
rise.
As one unconcerned respondent put it, I hadn’t really thought about it; I mean I’d thought about
global warming and how it raises the water, [but I thought] it was insignificant. The contractor
told us that it didn’t really matter. Others were under the impression that sea level rise had
already been taken into account in the elevation plan: Flooding . . . is one of our concerns … I’m
pretty sure [the port considered] sea level rise. The new floodplain maps drafted by FEMA do
not, however, incorporate any climate change projections (FEMA 2009).
Perceptions of Stakeholders in Providence
The Providence stakeholder cluster interviewed consisted of three internal port representatives,
16 from the public policy sector, seven from economic/contractual firms, three from academia,
and one from a community/environmental group. Interviews mentioned 14 unique direct
damages, seven indirect damages, and 15 intangible consequences. As above, we assessed how
different stakeholder groups considered impacts of our storm scenario by simply averaging the
number of unique impacts mentioned for interviewees in each stakeholder group. Figure 15
shows a radar plat with these results and suggests that different types of stakeholder think about
impacts in different ways. The port representatives focused more on the direct damages and
indirect costs, with no mentions at all of the intangible consequences of the event. Both public
agencies and academics tended to talk about the intangibles more and the economic/contractual
stakeholders talked about all three types. Though the sample size was small, these findings do
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suggest that gaps may exist in how different stakeholders consider these types of storm impacts.
Figure 15 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Providence)
5.1.2. QUESTION	
  2:	
  How	
  will	
  internal	
  and	
  external	
  stakeholders	
  bear	
  the	
  costs	
  resulting	
  from	
  
a	
  hurricane	
  hitting	
  the	
  port?	
  

This question was designed to explore how the costs of the impacts identified might distribute
amongst different stakeholders. Port stakeholders of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI)
identified a wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences of a
hurricane hitting the port and these would result in costs that would be borne by all port
stakeholders as well as society as a whole, as depicted in the tables in Section 4. For each of the
impacts noted, we assigned the cost (economic or non) to one or more stakeholders, based on our
own intuition as informed through interviews and a review of organizational missions and
mandates. Overall, we found that these costs were well distributed throughout the stakeholder
clusters, with the port bearing the most responsibility for direct damages. The indirect costs and
costs associated with intangible consequences will likely fall more heavily upon the external
stakeholders, as seen in rather than on the internal stakeholders of the port. All stakeholders will
bear the costs to some extent, with the potential impacts affecting the environment, quality of
life, jobs, emergency recovery, and much more. Next we look at costs for each of the case
studies independently.
Costs in Gulfport
Figure 16 shows what percentage of the distinct identified costs fall upon each of four
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stakeholder groups.3 The internal port (i.e., the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport) and
the economic/contractual stakeholders (e.g., the shippers, insurance companies, and port tenants)
would likely bear a large percentage of the direct damages (93% and 83% respectively) and the
indirect costs (94% and 83% respectively). Eighty percent of intangible costs would be borne by
the public policy (and by implication, taxpayers) and community/environmental groups. Though
this analysis does not indicate the magnitude of costs, it does suggest that the external
stakeholder groups will likely be most affected by the indirect costs and intangible consequences
resulting from a hurricane hitting the port.
Figure 16 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Gulfport)
Costs in Providence
In Providence, the costs distributed similarly to Gulfport: the internal port and
economic/contractual stakeholders would bear the highest percentage of the direct damage and
indirect costs, while the public policy and community/stakeholder groups would bear the highest
percentage of the intangible costs (Figure 17). However, differentiating between the external and
internal stakeholders is fuzzier in the case of Providence, in particular when assessing the costs
of the various impacts identified. Unlike Gulfport, where the port is contained in one very
specific location and operated by the MSPA, the Port of Providence covers a large geographic
area and includes numerous independent firms. There is no overarching port authority with
responsibility for the entire district. For the purposes of this analysis, we assigned costs to the
Port (i.e., Waterson Terminal Services) only if the Port itself would directly pay for the repair or
recovery cost.
3

In this portion of the analysis, the “academic/research” stakeholders are excluded, as these stakeholders would not
likely bear any unique to them as a stakeholder group.

57

Figure 17 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Providence)
No impact assessments had been conducted in either Providence or Gulfport with a goal to
identify the full range of impacts at a scale that is wide enough to capture concerns of multiple
stakeholders of the port, yet narrow enough to trace the root of the impact back to one particular
facility. Results from these case studies suggest that much of the burden for these external costs,
as well as those internal costs that exceed the port’s insurance coverage will ultimately be borne
by the public in the form of disaster relief, cleanup and rebuilding costs, and negative impacts on
the environment and quality of life. These case studies identified an area for future research into
disconnects between current port resilience planning practices, impacts assessments, and
understanding the costs of storm impacts at ports that are ultimately borne by the public.
5.1.3. QUESTION	
  3:	
  In	
  what	
  ways	
  are	
  port	
  stakeholders	
  considering	
  the	
  resilience	
  of	
  the	
  port	
  
in	
  planning	
  and	
  policy?	
  
In this section, we compare the impacts that were identified in existing planning and policy
documents with those concerns expressed in interviews. To appropriately plan for port resilience,
the full range of impacts and cost burdens must be understood and accounted for through port
planning, local/state planning, or both. These impacts may be identified through vulnerability
assessments (Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010) or incorporated into other more general
plans. Through the review of documents for these two case studies, we found that Gulfport had
16 planning/policy documents that assessed Hurricane Katrina damages in the region and at the
port, but we found no study that could be considered a “vulnerability assessment” that addressed
the port specifically. Providence had six planning/policy documents that addressed both the port
and storms and two that could be considered vulnerability assessments, though not vulnerability
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assessments of the port specifically. In both cases, far more impacts were discussed in interviews
than in documents and intangible consequences figured prominently in the minds of
interviewees. We next examine findings from each of the two case studies.
Gulfport’s documents vs. interviews
Interviews and document comparison shows the differences between how stakeholders perceive
impacts of the storm and how the port’s planning documents address them. Figure 18 shows the
number of mentions for each of the three categories of impacts in interviews only, documents
only, and both interviews and documents. Overall, the specific impacts of past or future
hurricanes at the port received little attention in the documents. The port’s own planning and
policy documents from Gulfport focus primarily on direct damages, with very few mentions of
intangible consequences. Most of the specific impacts that were noted in these documents,
originated from just one source: the damage assessment conducted by the MSPA after Katrina.
This report went into great detail on the individual direct damages to port property.
Very few indirect costs were cited in the documents, but those that were, included tonnage
declines, employment losses, and lost tenants. Missing from the documents was analysis of the
role the port plays in the wider region and the many ways that damage to port infrastructure
ripples out to affect the port cluster as a whole. Interviewees, on the other hand, were far more
concerned with the intangible consequences. This suggests that stakeholders of the port cluster
had many concerns about hurricanes at the port that had not been formally addressed through
planning and policy resulting in found a gap between stakeholder concerns and resilience
planning for the port
Figure 18 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Gulfport)
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Of the documents analyzed and coded from Gulfport, ten were drafted by the MSPA and
addressed plans to restore and expand the port after Katrina. This project was funded through
The Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through a $621m grant
from the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to rebuild and repair
the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina (Becker 2013). The allocated funds were to “provide
mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in
Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port
(MSPA 2010),” though no specific requirements were attached to the funding. Then-Governor
Haley Barber also prioritized a port that would be more storm resistant. In the plan, the
improvements would potentially attract new customers, as no other port on the Gulf Coast offers
such hurricane protection.
Public comment and review for the elevation project reflected that the broader stakeholder
cluster did not bring these concerns to the attention of the port. Most of the public comments
addressed job creation, instead of the hurricane protection strategies the port planned to
incorporate. For its part, the MSPA’s main mission is to be “a profitable, self-sufficient port
providing world-class maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate
the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade and creation of
employment” (CH2M Hill 2010). There is no explicit mandate for the port to consider the
interests of other stakeholders in the cluster or the long-term viability of the port, though many
interests and goals are common to both groups. In addition, the funding the port received for the
project had no specific requirements for hurricane resilience; rather, the HUD mandate was tied
to job creation. By the time our research was completed, the port commissioners had voted to
abandon the elevation plan entirely in favor of investment in a channel-deepening project. As
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stated by one of the port commissioners in a newspaper article, "I need to move forward. We
need to get jobs. We need to get moving out and get this behind us” (MSPG 2012). A logical
next step would be surveying the stakeholders themselves to better quantify their perceptions of
the importance of the various impacts noted by the cluster as a whole.
Providence’s documents vs. interviews
Given the far-reaching impacts across the stakeholder cluster, one might expect to find port
resilience against hurricanes referenced in many of the Providence documents we reviewed.
However, most of the stakeholders in the cluster had no planning or policy documents that
specifically addressed port resilience and those that did address it, did so in a cursory manner.
Sixteen impacts total were mentioned in the six documents, fewer than half the number discussed
in interviews (Figure 19). About half of the impacts identified in these documents came from just
one plan: the “Hazards Chapter” (CRMC 2011) of the Metro Bay Special Area Management
Plan (SAMP). It mentions seven specific impacts, with eight references to debris. It also
mentions three of the direct damages that could occur at the port itself and it includes the port in
its list of critical facilities. Other plans, however, did not include the port as a critical facility. In
the Hazard Mitigation Plans, for example, critical facilities were specifically discussed in terms
of their vulnerability, but the port was not addressed. These are defined as those “that are critical
to the health and welfare of the population and that are especially important following disasters.”
The plan goes on to identify nine specific types of critical facilities: marinas, shelters, schools,
hospitals, fire and rescue stations, police stations, water supply points, and rail road
stations/airports. The port does not show up in this list, nor is it mentioned explicitly as a
potential resource following a disaster, despite research that indicates role a port can play in postdisaster recovery (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013). Similarly, the plan provides specific analysis for
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“state owned/operated facilities,” but because the port is not state owned or operated, it received
no explicit mention as warranting special consideration.
Figure 19 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Providence)
The City of Providence Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (PEMA 2010) also addressed
port issues, but the assessment focused primarily on terrorist attacks with respect to the port. The
plan only notes that flooding poses a threat to shipping, port operations, business and property
and that, “Uninterrupted port operations have economic benefits to the City.” It provides no
further analysis, though does include a recommendation for the City of Providence to conduct
further study of the port to, “Identify upgrades necessary to limit damage due to flooding and
earthquake” and to “Retrofit the Port of Providence facility to protect against flood and
earthquake damage.”
The planning gap suggested in our findings is confirmed in part in a passage of the Hazards
Chapter of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMC 2011), that states
this as an area of concern:

Existing [planning] documents (either outdated or in draft form) do not
adequately address or link to other plans to address hazard issues on the
waterfront. This is problematic because of the unique hazards present in the port
districts of Providence ... The port areas … carry major infrastructure and supply
the region with critical goods, in both post- and pre-hazard conditions. Guidance
could include evacuation of shore-side facilities, structural mitigation of shoreline
structures, safe harbor recommendations, and boat pullout procedures and
priorities, as well as address other concern issues such as spills, contamination
caused by inundation, and facility closures. It should be noted additionally that
new requirements for facility evacuation, import of supplies, emergency transport,
etc. might be placed on this infrastructure in the case of a hazard scenario.
Another aspect of the planning gap results from construction of existing infrastructure in the port
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area being completed decades before appropriate land use and building codes took affect, as
noted by the CRMC (2011). Much of that infrastructure still exists and is operational, despite
designs that would not be up to today’s regulatory standards. However, even structures build in
recent decades in accordance with current codes and regulations are not designed to withstand
new environmental conditions likely to occur due to climate change. The results of analysis of
interviews and documents in this case study indicate that the concerns of stakeholders and the
potential impacts of a hurricane hitting the Port of Providence have not been addressed in the
stakeholders’ formal planning documents.
5.2.

Comparative	
  assessment	
  of	
  Gulfport	
  and	
  Providence	
  

This study was not designed to be a comparative cases study, as many variables differentiate
these two ports (e.g., size, type of cargo, management structure, etc.). However, there are some
overall observations that can be made between the two and they contribute to a deeper
understanding of what happens to the port stakeholder cluster when the port suffers a major
hurricane. In Providence, stakeholders identified many such potential impacts ex ante an actual
storm event. We found many similarities and some marked differences between impacts noted in
Providence and those noted ex post facto by stakeholders in Gulfport This section discusses first
the similarities and then the differences between the two case studies.
5.2.1. Similarities	
  between	
  Gulfport	
  and	
  Providence	
  
In both case study ports, planning and policy documents addressed few of the concerns
expressed by stakeholders. This was the case both in Gulfport, where the Mississippi State Port
Authority (MSPA) was focusing on implementing a resilience strategy in response to a recent
hurricane, and Providence, where no such effort existed, but there was a culture of leadership
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around climate adaptation in the State.
In Gulfport, post-storm impact assessments from Katrina addressed direct damages at the port
and other impacts on a regional scale. These assessments provide information that can serve as a
foundation for resilience plans, such as the one that was being undertaken for the Port of
Gulfport. Though the MSPA had plans for a resilience strategy, the planning documents included
little input from port stakeholders about storm impacts and few references to the many concerns
identified in interviews. In Providence, no post-hurricane event impact assessments for the
stakeholders had been conducted, due to the fact that no such event has taken place in their
recent history. There were, however, vulnerability assessments conducted on statewide and
citywide scales, but these did not specifically address the port or its stakeholders in detail.
Although one university study done in Rhode Island identifies many of the consequences of a
storm ex ante (in particular with respect to debris), most formal documentation either does not
address the port directly or focuses primarily on emergency response. Neither interviews nor the
documents in Providence identified any established process for identifying the wider impacts that
a storm event would have on port stakeholders.
Though Gulfport results showed a higher number of impacts cited overall, the trends were the
same in both case studies. In both, the highest number were intangible consequences, followed
by direct damages, and then indirect costs. Providence and Gulfport respondents identified a
comparable number of intangible consequences and in both cases debris stood out as a top
concern. All three of the individual impacts that were cited with the highest frequency fell into
this category. In Providence, the top impacts mentioned most frequently in interviews were
debris (11 times), pollution to the waterway (11 times), and disruption in energy supply (10
times). The first two of these were each mentioned twice in the Providence planning documents.
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In Gulfport, the top impacts mentioned most frequently were containers all over the city (20
times), chicken and pork bellies all over the city (13 times), and debris polluting the environment
(nine times). Cleanup of debris in and around the Port of Gulfport took more than six months
after Katrina, explaining why this was a top concern (Miller and Birdsall 2010).	
  	
  
Like in Providence, Gulfport stakeholders felt concern over a very wide range of potential
impacts resulting from a lack of resilience at the port. Like Providence, no formalized process
existed to ensure that these concerns were recognized and incorporated into the planning process.
The consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and the costs these events have for society as a
whole suggest that bridging this planning gap would benefit all stakeholders.
5.2.2. Differences	
  Between	
  Gulfport	
  and	
  Providence	
  
While Providence interviewees tended toward more generality in their descriptions of potential
impacts, Gulfport interviewees were more specific as they had prior and direct experience
dealing with a hurricane at port. This resulted in a far greater number of total impacts mentioned
in Gulfport than in Providence. Gulfport’s respondents and document review yielded far more
specifics in the categories of direct damages and indirect costs. For example Providence
interviewees mentioned a general, Damage to port equipment, while Gulfport interviewees
mentioned the specifics of, Damage to cranes and Damage to the fencing system. Gulfport’s
planning documents for port restoration also focused far more attention on direct damages than
on the indirect costs or intangibles consequences. Given that Gulfport was still recovering from
Hurricane Katrina at the time of the interviews, it is not surprising that they had a much higher
awareness of some of these specific impacts.
Worth noting is how little overlap there was between the specific impacts identified in the two
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case studies. Of the 107 distinct impacts mentioned, only 17 occurred in both case studies.
Though both ports face high hurricane exposure and both are small to medium sized ports, like
all ports, they are quite different in terms of cargo handled, environmental conditions,
management, and equipment. This finding suggests that, while it is difficult to generalize with
respect to the unique ways that hurricanes impact port stakeholders, the overall trend of concern
for higher proportions intangible consequences may hold true across all ports, though this
requires further testing.
Although the sample size for both Providence and Gulfport is small, we analyzed how internal
stakeholders of the port considered impacts. Results in Section 5.1 suggest that the internal
stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport have a much broader awareness of the full range of impacts
than their counterparts in Providence This is likely because:
1. Port of Gulfport is operated by a state port authority and thus more engaged with other
stakeholders, and
2. The experience with Katrina left the interviewees with a much more detailed
understanding of what actually happens as a result of a major storm, suggesting that site
visits between these two ports could be a way to share lessons learned.
The preceding section provided some analysis comparing the results from the two case studies.
We next take a big picture view of the broader implications this work has for planning and
policy.
5.3.

Planning	
  and	
  Policy	
  implications	
  

This research was designed to contribute a better understanding of the nature of the climate
change problem for one particular port stakeholder system in two case study ports. It does not
allow for a detailed assessment of the many other factors, including: the magnitude of impacts,
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how the impacts are linked,	
   probability of the various impacts, their specific costs, how
stakeholders prioritize their concerns, and many other issues that would be components of a
thorough vulnerability assessment at the stakeholder scale. This exploratory study, rather, yields
results that represent the diversity of consequences that stakeholders perceive to be of
importance when a major storm hits a piece of infrastructure – in this case, the port. This case
study lays the groundwork for future research on seaport resilience that can be conducted at a
scale that is narrow enough to be able to trace impacts back to one source e.g., a port), but broad
enough to recognize the role that the port plays for a wide variety of stakeholders. Two issues in
particular, however, emerged as particularly relevant for planning and policy: a lack of
leadership and a need for qualitative impact assessments for ports. These are discussed below in
more detail.
5.3.1. Leadership	
  issues	
  
This analysis revealed a lack of clarity around leadership issues for building long-term port
resilience in both ports. In Providence, no clear leadership responsibility for building the
resilience of the port emerged, even though the perceptions of consequences of underscore the
critical nature of resilience planning. In Gulfport, documents and interviews indicated that
resilience planning was left primarily to the port, but that the port’s planning process was driven
predominantly by profit and job creation goals leaving some stakeholder concerns out of the
planning process. Traditionally, port planning has taken place within the confines of the port
operating business (often the port authority), with little input from other stakeholders.4 The task
of enhancing the port’s resilience to a level that adequately protects all stakeholders, and thus the

4

In Europe, for example, a survey conducted by the European Sea Ports Organization found that only 17%
of ports involved local communities and stakeholders in port development plans (Brooke 1991).
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public interest, is likely beyond the means of any given port operator. Though there are strategies
that fall within the mandate, jurisdiction, and missions of all organizations, a coordination of
individual efforts would be necessary. A master planning effort would be one way to ensure that
the implementation of individual strategies complemented each other and that moving toward
resilience could occur in a coordinated fashion.
The Port of Providence comprises a complex group of private and public entities. The port
terminal itself, ProvPort, operated by a private company, does not have a strategic planning
process that includes port resilience, nor does it have the financial or staff resources to invest in
leading a climate adaptation effort that addresses storm resilience issues. The same holds for the
many other smaller businesses that make up the Port of Providence. Since, overall, the Port of
Providence provides a public good, the government is positioned to play a role in conducting
vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning, and creating policy that leads to appropriate
levels of resilience to protect the greater interests of society. However, much of the port falls
outside of the jurisdictional authority of the state since it is located landward of the mean high
tide line that delimits public and private property. Though some port lands are owned by the City
of Providence, respondents indicated that the City stays mostly uninvolved in planning and
operations.
Research and academic organizations, such as the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the
University of Rhode Island, are poised to facilitate assessment and planning at a stakeholder
scale. On behalf of the CRMC, the CRC has facilitated similar processes in the past that resulted
in changes across stakeholder groups. For example, a “Balancing Uses of the Working
Waterfront” workshop brought stakeholders together to assess ways that seemingly conflicting
uses could be better harmonized (CRC 2007). This effort resulted in changes to state and city
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policy, business plans of independent firms, and the formation of a new stakeholder alliance
group that now represents the common interest of waterfront businesses. Because the CRC
served as a neutral facilitator, diverse stakeholders came together to share information freely and
plan for mutually beneficial outcomes. A similar effort could help focus research and planning at
the port stakeholder scale for	
  adaptation	
  planning.	
  
5.3.2. Qualitative	
  impact	
  assessments	
  
In Providence and Gulfport, many concerns expressed by stakeholders were not identified in
planning and policy documents, suggesting a disconnect between how stakeholders perceive
impacts and how official policy addresses these impacts. Categorizing, quantifying, and
assessing impacts of natural disasters on specific sectors are daunting but critical components of
disaster-mitigation planning (Canton 2008). Results indicate that planning and policy should
consider more than traditional quantitative direct damage assessment by including qualitative
assessment tools that address indirect costs and intangible consequences resulting from a
hurricane at the port. While reducing the risk of direct damages also reduces the risk of many of
the other impacts, a broader range of considerations would be appropriate, especially given
climate change. Concerted efforts to include the full range of stakeholders in planning/policy for
resilience could help bridge the gap between concerns and how they are accounted for in these
documents. Even in Gulfport where Hurricane Katrina devastated the port, the resilience portion
of the port’s strategic plan is largely overshadowed by the desire to expand operations, increase
tonnage throughput and create jobs.
These case studies did not seek to monetize or otherwise quantify the actual costs of impacts.
Rather, they served to help identify and define perceptions around the nature of the problem that
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climate change presents to stakeholders of the port as storms intensify and sea levels rise. Many
of the impacts do not appear to be considered in stakeholder plans and policies for enhancing
port resilience. The impacts reported most by stakeholders (intangible consequences) are those
that appear least in the formal planning documents and also those that are most conducive to
qualitative assessment. This gap leads to many questions, such as: Are the investments in
resilience enhancement adequate to meet the needs of the full cluster of stakeholders? If the
direct damages were mitigated, which indirect costs and intangible consequences would also be
mitigated? Given how few of the stakeholders’ concerns are reflected in the port’s planning
documents, how comfortable are the stakeholders with the level of resilience the port is
planning?
5.3.3. The	
  issue	
  of	
  scale	
  
Though we did not set out to address the question of “why” specifically these types of gaps may
exist, analysis of interview data and documents suggest one potential reason: Planning gaps may
result from both a mismatch of timescales and geographic scales, as port operators make
investment decisions based primarily on the interest of the port as a business, while state and
regional planning efforts do not address the port specifically enough to protect society’s longterm interest in port functions. Port operators typically make investment decisions based on the
best interest of port business on a 5-10 year time horizon, as found in a recent survey of port
authorities perspectives on climate adaptation (Becker et al. 2012) and in descriptions of the
strategic planning process for ports (Allen 2012; Dooms and Macharis 2003). Considering the
impacts of strong hurricanes in the face of climate change, on the other hand, must include time
horizons that are well beyond the 5-10 year range for the sake of both the business interests of
the port and the interests of the other external stakeholders in the cluster.
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In addition to the mismatched timescales, the geographic scales may be mismatched. For
example, the port planning process tends to focus on the port business alone (very local scale),
while the public policy planning process tends to be more regional in scale. The “stakeholder
cluster” scale is between the two. This was evident in Gulfport where damage assessments were
either regional or port-specific, but did not focus at the stakeholder cluster scale to examine the
ways that damage to this one piece of infrastructure affected its many stakeholders. In
Providence, there were regional assessments, but also none that addressed either the port cluster
or the port specifically.

5.4.

Limitations	
  and	
  next	
  steps	
  

There are numerous next steps involved in effective planning for a future that includes more
frequent and more intense storm events. One next step would be conducting a more formal risk
analysis that allows for probabilities and specific costs to be assigned to the various impacts and
asks stakeholders to prioritize and their level of concern. There are numerous tools that can aid in
this decision support process (Haymaker and Chachere 2006) and similar exercises have begun
to be carried out, though not at the port stakeholder-cluster scale described here (see for example
the Port of San Diego 2013).
The case studies, too, had several limitations. First, the sample size was relatively small, making
it difficult to compare how different sectors of stakeholders felt concern about different types of
impacts or how different types of stakeholders perceived strategies differently. Results did not
assess how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts or strategies they mentioned. Just because
an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of greater
importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the
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linkages between impacts, as reducing the vulnerability for one direct damage might offset
multiple indirect costs and intangible consequences. Interview analysis also indicates some
perception gaps in how different types of stakeholders consider impacts. For example, little
concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or on the intermodal system with which a
port interfaces. An assessment of how these gaps in perceptions align with jurisdictions and
mandates would help ensure that all aspects of impacts are considered in future resilience plans.
The impacts collected in this research were also generated from within the stakeholder cluster
itself. There are likely additional impacts that were overlooked, but are nevertheless significant.
Finally, the interviews did not specifically emphasize questions of strategy implementation,
because, even though stakeholders identified potential strategies, they did not discuss who
would/should take a leadership role, how effective the strategies would likely be, the suitable
timeline for their implementation, and how they would be funded. These questions can be
addressed through further work in these and other case study locations.
Had interviewees been more specific, some of the intangible consequences may have been
categorized as indirect costs. However, the interviewees tended to talk about impacts in very
broad terms; thus it was difficult to determine which, if any, aspect of the impact could be
quantified in financial terms. In many cases, coding their concerns with specificity was
extremely difficult. For example, many interviewees made statements like, You’re going to have
a lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to [comprehend]. In
some cases, follow up questions elicited more specificity, but many interviewees were vague
when it came to details. This challenge, however, only underscores the necessity for the type of
research undertaken in this case study so that potential impacts can be named, perceptions
shared, and ultimately better planning and policy developed to address them.	
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Assessing how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts was not covered in this study. Just
because an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of
greater importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the
linkages between impacts, as mitigating one direct damage might offset multiple indirect costs
and intangible consequences. A next step is to revisit the Port of Gulfport and ask stakeholders to
prioritize and rank the relative value of the different impacts mentioned, as well as to trace the
pathways between impacts. A network analysis tool could help determine which impacts stand
out as central nodes from which other impacts result.
Our interview analysis indicates some perception gaps in how different sectors of stakeholders
consider impacts. For example, little concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or
on the intermodal system with which ports interface. An assessment of how these gaps in
perception align with jurisdictions and mandates would help identify areas that warrant more
attention in planning. If, for example, federal entities show concern for environmental impacts
but have no mandate or jurisdiction over the potential source of those impacts, then improved
communications and planning could help address this disconnect.
The impacts noted in this study are limited to the perceptions of those identified by the
stakeholders within the port cluster itself. There may be other impacts that were either unknown
or not identified by these stakeholders. An “expert analysis” by a group external to the
stakeholder cluster could identify these other potential impacts.

6. Conclusion	
  
These two case studies utilized a grounded theory approach (to create impact names and
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subcategories) combined with a deductive analysis approach (to determine broad categories in
accordance with IPCC definitions) to create a categorization of impacts and an analysis of which
stakeholders would likely bear the cost for each. Through a review of official documents and
interviews with port stakeholders, we found that stakeholders perceived a wide variety of
impacts and costs resulting from a hurricane hitting the port and that these impacts fell into the
three broad categories defined by the IPCC (IPCC 2012). These include direct damages to the
port (including the waterway and intermodal connections), indirect costs that can be quantified in
economic terms and intangible consequences that cannot be easily quantified in economic terms.
Interviews and planning/policy documents from Gulfport show that stakeholders perceive that
storms at the port result in direct damage to the port itself, but also on the quality of life and
business in the region, and the environment. Stakeholders described their experience with
Hurricane Katrina and their concerns for another similar storm. Gulfport makes for an excellent
case study because of its experience related to hurricane Katrina and the MSPA’s consideration
of plans to rebuild in a more hurricane-resistant fashion. Many stakeholders' concerns did not
appear in formalized documents that concerned planning and policy for the port. We also found
that hurricane resilience was not a priority for respondents when it came to providing
commentary and input to the port’s planning process. In the face of climate change, we suggest
that port resilience plans consider not just the impacts on the port itself, but the impacts storms
have on the wider port cluster. As seen in this study, the true costs of an event at the port are
distributed amongst many stakeholders. The concerns expressed by stakeholders and the port’s
decisions about resilience strategies suggest that stronger stakeholder engagement would help
future resilience planning efforts.
In Providence, the results from this study suggest that while a collective awareness around
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hurricane impacts on port stakeholders exists amongst stakeholders, the port planning and policy
documents include little guidance on port resilience generally, and explicitly mentioned only
about half of all identified impacts. Neither the port operator, nor the external stakeholders of the
port, addressed long-term resilience planning in their policies and plans in any detail, yet external
stakeholders outside of the port are at risk for shouldering many costs associated with a lack of
proper planning.
Both cases show an overall trend of high levels of concern for intangible consequences and
many costs that will be borne across the stakeholder cluster. Both also show gaps in how impacts
are addressed through official planning and policy. These findings suggest that the diversity of
impacts resulting from a hurricane hitting these ports, the increasing risk of these events due to
climate change, and the potential costs to society, warrant that planners and practitioners more
fully consider port resilience and hurricane impacts in future planning efforts and bridge the gap
between perceptions and formalize planning/policy. We suggest that understanding how
stakeholders, planners, and policy makers as a cluster perceive these impacts can lead to a
greater emphasis on resilience planning for the port that benefits all stakeholders.
END
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Figure 13 -- Unique impacts mentioned in Gulfport and Providence
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Figure 14 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Gulfport)
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Figure 15 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Providence)
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Figure 16 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Gulfport)
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Figure 17 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Providence)

30"
Interviews"only"
25"

25"

Documents"only"
Both"interviews"and"documents"

20"

15"

14"
11"

11"

10"

5"

5"

5"
2"

2"

2"

0"
Direct"damages"
Indirect"costs"
Intangible"consequences"
Number'of'impact'types'men2oned'in'interviews'vs.'documents'
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Figure 19 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Providence
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Table 1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics

Throughput in Throughput
tons
in TEUs

2,200,000
(2011)

216,156
(2011)

Primary
freight

Hurricane Highest
Last
# Of
probability recorded
major
hurricanes
storm
storm
1858-2009
surge
(Year)
Containers
High
30 feet
2005
25
Bulk
(2005) (Katrina –
Break-bulk
Cat 3)

Table 2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006)

Asset value prior to Hurricane Katrina
Post-Katrina [2006] tonnage as compared to Pre-Katrina
Tonnage for September -- December 2004
Effect on staffing
Effect on revenues
Types of [direct] damage
Direct damage assessment
Anticipated source of funding for repairs (2006)

$127,573,778
69%
Retained 100% of staff
Decreased by 70%
Damaged or destroyed port
buildings and warehouses;
damaged warehouses;
$50,556,175
Port funds, FEMA, and insurance

Table 3 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port restoration

List of Sources, Agencies and Persons Consulted [40 CFR 1508.9(b)]
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians-Tribal Historic Preservation Officer
Mississippi Department of Archives and History
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Air Quality Branch
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Hazardous Waste Branch
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Water Quality Branch
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources
Mississippi Department of Transportation
Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks
Mississippi Development Authority/CDBG Disaster Recovery Program
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
Mississippi State Port Authority
Harrison County Board of Supervisors
Harrison County Utility Authority
City of Gulfport-Planning
City of Gulfport-Floodplain Manager
Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Department of Agriculture-Natural Resources Conservation Service
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Mobile District
U.S. Department of Interior-U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
U.S. Department of Commerce-National Marine Fisheries Service
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
BMI Environmental

Table 4 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport

YEAR
1998

DECISION
Expand port by 84 Acres

2003

ACTORS
MSPA, MDA

Complete 2003 Master Plan

Begin filling 60 of 84 acres as per 2003
Master Plan

2003
2005

ACTION

AECOM,
MSPA,
Governor
(Gov.)
MSPA

HURRICANE KATRINA DESTROYS PORT

Identify resilience strategies /
revisit expansion plan
2005
Choose “Evacuation model” as
resilience strategy

Governor,
MSPS,
AECOM

2006

MS applies for $600m funding from HUD
to support restoration and resilience

Gov.,
MSPA,
MDA

2006

Update 2003 Master Plan and incorporate
new evacuation model as resilience
strategy

Gov.,
MSPA,
MDA,
AECOM

2007

MS obtains $600m for CDBG/HUD
funding in support of Restoration Program

Gov., MDA

2007

2007 – MSPA hires CH2M Hill to review
and implement the revised 2007 Port
Master Plan

MSPA,
CH2M Hill,
Gov

Review 2007 Master Plan
Update, reject evacuation
2007
strategy and create new 25’
elevation strategy

Gov.,
MSPA,
MDA,
CH2M Hill

MSPA begins additional
“Expansion Program”
2007 component be completed in
conjunction with “Restoration
Program”

Gov.,
MSPA,
MDA

2010

MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental
Assessment for Restoration Program

MSPA,
MDA, HUD

2010

MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental
Impact Statement for Expansion Program

MSPA,
MDA,
USACE

2011

Complete 60 acre fill, begin 24 acre fill and
MSPA
elevation

2012 Abandon plan to elevate port

Redirect $140 million to channel dredging
project

MSPA

Table 5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport
Stakeholders	
  

Organization	
  interviewed	
  

Port	
  interests	
  

Interv
iews	
  

Internal	
  Stakeholders	
  

Internal	
  port	
  
stakeholders	
  

Mississippi	
  State	
  Port	
  Authority	
  
(MSPA)	
  
Mississippi	
  Development	
  Authority	
  
(MDA)	
  
CH2M	
  Hill	
  (Contracted	
  by	
  MSPA)	
  

Make	
  port	
  an	
  economic	
  engine	
  for	
  the	
  state,	
  provide	
  
jobs	
  
Make	
  port	
  an	
  economic	
  engine	
  for	
  the	
  state,	
  provide	
  
jobs,	
  oversee	
  long-‐term	
  planning	
  for	
  port	
  
Provide	
  program	
  management	
  and	
  support	
  for	
  
restoration	
  project	
  

3	
  
1	
  
1	
  

External	
  Stakeholders	
  
External	
  
economic/contractual	
  
stakeholders	
  

	
  

Public	
  policy	
  (federal)	
  

	
  

Public	
  policy	
  (state)	
  

	
  

Public	
  policy	
  (local)	
  

	
  
Community	
  groups	
  

Port	
  tenants	
  (Chiquita,	
  Dole,	
  
Crowley,	
  DuPont,	
  Island	
  View	
  
Casino)	
  
Steward	
  Sneed	
  Insurance	
  

Port	
  user,	
  supply	
  fruit	
  to	
  customers	
  

1	
  

Manage	
  risk	
  and	
  protect	
  port	
  assets	
  

2	
  

Kansas	
  City	
  Southern	
  Railroad	
  

	
  

0	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

US	
  Coast	
  Guard	
  (USCG)	
  

Facilitate	
  the	
  navigational	
  needs	
  of	
  the	
  port	
  and	
  
shipping,	
  facilitate	
  storm	
  operations	
  
Facilitate	
  maritime	
  commerce,	
  protect	
  marine	
  
resources,	
  maintain	
  ship	
  channel	
  	
  
Facilitate	
  disaster	
  preparation,	
  mitigation,	
  response,	
  
and	
  recovery	
  
Provide	
  weather	
  and	
  climate	
  data	
  

1	
  

	
  

0	
  

State	
  Senate	
  (Senator	
  Wicker)	
  

	
  

0	
  

Environmental	
  Protection	
  Agency	
  

	
  

0	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

US	
  Army	
  Corps	
  of	
  Engineers	
  
(USACE)	
  
US	
  Federal	
  Emergency	
  
Management	
  Agency	
  (FEMA)	
  
National	
  Oceanic	
  and	
  Atmospheric	
  
Association	
  (NOAA)	
  
US	
  Customs	
  

2	
  
5	
  
1	
  

Gulf	
  Regional	
  Planning	
  Commission	
   Long	
  range	
  planning	
  for	
  regional	
  transportation	
  
system	
  
Gulf	
  of	
  Mexico	
  Alliance	
  (GOMA)	
  
Coastal	
  community	
  resilience	
  

1	
  

Mississippi	
  Emergency	
  
Management	
  Agency	
  (MEMA)	
  
Mississippi	
  Department	
  of	
  
Transportation	
  (MDOT)	
  
Mississippi	
  Department	
  of	
  Marine	
  
Resources	
  (MDMR)	
  
	
  

Review	
  port	
  project	
  applications	
  

3	
  

Construction	
  and	
  maintenance	
  of	
  connecting	
  
infrastructure	
  
Activities	
  at	
  the	
  port	
  that	
  impact	
  coastal	
  waters	
  or	
  
wetlands	
  
	
  

1	
  

Harrison	
  County	
  Civil	
  Defense	
  

1	
  

City	
  of	
  Gulfport	
  

Facilitate	
  local	
  emergency	
  response,	
  including	
  
evacuations	
  
Represent	
  citizens	
  of	
  the	
  city	
  in	
  port	
  decisions	
  

Southern	
  Mississippi	
  Planning	
  and	
  
Development	
  
	
  

Grant	
  facilitation	
  for	
  transportation	
  project	
  adjacent	
  to	
   1	
  
port	
  
	
  
	
  

STEPS	
  Neighborhood	
  Group	
  

Protect	
  adjacent	
  communities,	
  advocate	
  for	
  jobs	
  
growth	
  

1	
  

3	
  
	
  

1	
  

1	
  

Table 6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence
Stakeholders	
  

Organization	
  
interviewed	
  

Port	
  interests	
  

Intervi
ews	
  

Internal	
  Stakeholders	
  
Internal	
  Stakeholders	
  

Waterson	
  
Services	
  

Terminal	
  

Generate	
  profit	
  

3	
  

Univar	
  
Affiliated	
  Insurance	
  
Managers	
  
Moran	
  Shipping	
  Agency	
  
Promet	
  Marine	
  Services	
  
Marine	
  Pilots	
  Association	
  
Rhode	
  Island	
  Oil	
  Heat	
  
Institute	
  
	
  
US	
  Coast	
  Guard	
  

Port	
  tenant	
  
Reduce	
  risks	
  and	
  liability	
  

1	
  
1	
  

Service	
  port	
  and	
  users	
  
Repairs	
  to	
  ships	
  and	
  docks	
  
Pilots	
  all	
  commercial	
  traffic	
  to/from	
  the	
  port	
  
Represent	
  petroleum	
  companies	
  at	
  the	
  port	
  

2	
  
1	
  
0	
  
0	
  

	
  
Facilitate	
   maritime	
   commerce,	
   protect	
   marine	
  
resources,	
  maintain	
  ship	
  channel	
  

	
  
1	
  

US	
  Army	
  Corps	
  of	
  
Engineers	
  
National	
  Flood	
  Insurance	
  
Program	
  

Facilitate	
   maritime	
   commerce,	
   protect	
   marine	
  
resources,	
  maintain	
  ship	
  channel	
  
Facilitate	
  disaster	
  preparation,	
  mitigation,	
  response,	
  
and	
  recovery	
  

2	
  

	
  	
  
RI	
  Coastal	
  Resources	
  
Management	
  Council	
  
RI	
  Statewide	
  Planning	
  
RI	
  Economic	
  Development	
  
Corporation	
  
RI	
  Dept.	
  of	
  Transportation	
  
RI	
  Dept.	
  of	
  Env.	
  
Management	
  
RI	
  State	
  Senate	
  
	
  	
  
Providence	
  Planning	
  Dept.	
  
Providence	
  Emergency	
  
Management	
  Agency	
  
Providence	
  Fire	
  Dept.	
  

	
  	
  
Regulate	
  coastal	
  zone	
  

	
  
3	
  

Transportation	
  and	
  land	
  use	
  planning	
  
Generate	
  jobs,	
  economic	
  development	
  

1	
  
1	
  

Maintain/improve	
  highways/bridges	
  
Environmental	
  concerns	
  

1	
  
1	
  

	
  
	
  	
  
Promote	
  city	
  interests,	
  generate	
  taxes,	
  zoning	
  
Emergency	
  response	
  

1	
  
	
  
1	
  
1	
  

Emergency	
  response	
  

1	
  

Save	
  the	
  Bay	
  

Protect	
   adjacent	
   communities,	
   advocate	
   for	
   jobs	
  
growth	
  

1	
  

Brown	
  University	
  

Provide	
  research	
  capabilities	
  

1	
  

RI	
  Coastal	
  Resources	
  
Center	
  
URI	
  

Provide	
  research	
  capabilities	
  

1	
  

Provide	
  research	
  capabilities	
  

1	
  

External	
  Stakeholders	
  

Economic/contractual/
private	
  firms	
  

	
  

Public	
  policy	
  (Federal)	
  

	
  

Public	
  policy	
  (State)	
  

	
  
Public	
  policy	
  (local)	
  

1	
  

	
  
Community
	
  
Academic

Table 7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport
Title
1 Gulfport Master Plan Update 2007 Final Report
The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s
2 Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for
Expansion of the Ports

Author

Sponsor
organization

BDMJM Harris
and AECOM

MSPA

PEER

Mississippi
Legislature

Sector

Type of
document

Year

Port and private

Master Plan

2007

Public (local, state,
regional)

Report

2006
2005

3 Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Damage
assessment

4 Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Master Plan

2008

Master Planning the Port of Gulfport, Mississippi 5
Rebirth after Katrina

John Webb

MSPA

Port and private

Report

2007

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Implications for
6
Hurricane Science and Engineering

Building and Fire
Research
Laboratory NIST

National Science
Board

Public (federal)

Report

2006

Environmental Environmental Assessment and
Environmental Review Record for Community
7
MSPA
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Project at
State Port at Gulfport

MDA

Port and private

Environmental
Assessment

2010

8 Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance

Fritz et al

Georgia Tech

Academia and nonprofit

Academic
paper

2008

Read the Port of Gulfport's Restoration Program
9
Description

MSPA

MSPA

Reilly Morse

Mississippi
Center for Justice

10 Sustainable Restoration of the Port of Gulfport
11

The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of Gulfport
CH2M Hill
Restoration Program

12 Advancing in the Aftermath IV:

Loren C. Scott

MSPA
Capital One N.A.

Port and private

Press Release

2008

Academia and nonprofit

Report

2011

Port and private

Master Plan

2010

Report

2007

Academia and nonprofit
Academia and nonprofit

Letter of
opposition
Hazard
mitigation plan

13 Letter of opposition to HUD funding

Multiple

STEPS

14 Maritime Severe Weather Contingency Port Plan

USCG

USCG

Public (federal)

MDOT

MDOT

Public (local, state,
regional)

FAQ

2007

Haley Barbour

Ad Hoc
Subcommittee on
Disaster
Recovery

Public (local, state,
regional)

Testimony

2009

CH2M Hill

MSPA

Port and private

Presentation

2009

MEMA

Public (local, state,
regional)

Hazard
mitigation plan

2007

Port and private

Grant report

2011
2008
2011

15 Central Harrison County Connector Highway

16 Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour

17

Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Presubmittal
Meeting

18 State of Mississippi Hazard Mitigation Plan

State of MS

2007
2010

DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED
19 Federal Disaster Recovery Grant Report

MDA

MDA

Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan 20
Amendment 5 - Modification 1

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Port planning
document

21 MSPA Current and Projected Jobs

MSPA

MSPA

Port and private

Report

22 Question received on "request for ideas" proposal
The Projected Economic Impacts from Container
23
Terminal Development at Gulfport
Mississippi Unified Long-Range Transportation
24
Infrastructure Plan
25 State of Mississippi Budget 2011
26 Mississippi Pay Now, Pay Later:
27

Hurricane Katrina: Profile of a Super Cat Lessons and
Implications for Catastrophe Risk Management

28 Harrison County Flood Insurance Study
Mississippi Coastal Analysis Project - Coastal
Documentation and Main Engineering Report
Mississippi Coastal Improvements Project, Interim
30
Report
29

31 City of Gulfport Budget 2011
32 Harrison County Hurricane Surge Map

MSPA

MSPA

TranSystems

MSPA

Port and private

MDOT

MDOT

Public (local, state,
regional)

Transport Plan

2007

Joint Legislative
Budget
Committee
American
Security Project

Joint Legislative
Budget
Committee
American
Security Project

Public (local, state,
regional)

Budget

2011

Academia and nonprofit

Pamphlet

2011

Port and private

Report

2005

2009

Risk Management Risk Management
Solutions
Solutions

Port and private

Response to
public
comment
Economic
assessment

2010
2011

FEMA

FEMA

Public (federal)

Flood
insurance
study

FEMA

FEMA

Public (federal)

Report

2008

USACE

USACE

City of Gulfport
FEMA

City of Gulfport
FEMA

(Green background indicates document analyzed and coded)

Public (federal)

Report

2006

Public (local, state,
regional)

Budget

2011

Public (federal)

Flood
insurance
study

2009

Table 8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence
Title

1

DOCUMENTS ANALYZED
Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea
Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special Area
Management Plan

Author

Sponsor
organization

Sector

Type of
document

Year

Pam Rubinoff

Ri CRMC

Public (local,
state, regional)

Policy

2009

City of Providence
Local Hazard
Mitigation
Committee, Maguire
Group, Inc.

Rhode Island
Emergency
Management
Agency

Public (local,
state, regional)

Hazard
2011
mitigation plan

Public (local,
state, regional)

State planning
document

Port and private

Hazard
2011
mitigation plan

Public (local,
state, regional)

Report

Public (local,
state, regional)

Hazard
2009
mitigation plan

Brown
University

Academia and
non-profit

Student Report 2010

Timmons Roberts et Brown
al
University

Academia and
non-profit

Report

2010

Port and private

Economic
assessment

2008

Public (federal)

Planning
document

2009

2

Strategy for Reducing Risks from Natural Hazards
in Providence, Rhode Island: A Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Plan

3

Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Systems-Level Plan:
Ames Colt
2009-1013

4

Promet Marine Services Hurricane Preparedness
Checklist

5

Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment

6

Rhode Island State Hazard Mitigation Plan

7
8

DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED
Beyond No Regrets: Assessing the Economic
Efficiency of Climate Adaptation in Rhode Island
Summary: Preliminary Assessment of Rhode
Island's Vulnerability to Climate Change and its
Options for Adaptation Action

Promet Marine
Services
Providence
Emergency
Management
Agency
Rhode Island
Emergency
Management
Agency
Kyle A. Polar

Rhode Island
Bays, Rivers,
and Watersheds
Coordination
Team
Promet Marine
Services
Providence
Emergency
Management
Agency
Rhode Island
Emergency
Management
Agency

Providence
Working
Waterfront
Alliance
Dept. of
Homeland
Security

2008

2010

9

Economic Effects of Allens Avenue Businesses

FXM Associates

10

National Infrastructure Protection Plan

Unassigned

11

Rhode Island and Southeastern Massachusetts
Area Contingency Plan

Rhode Island and
Southeastern
USCG
Massachusetts Area
Committee

Public (federal)

Hazard
2010
mitigation plan

12

Rhode Island Hurricane Evacuation Study
Technical Report

USACE

Public (federal)

Report

1995

Public (local,
state, regional)

Report

2007

Public (local,
state, regional)

Report

2011

Academia and
non-profit

Pamphlet

2011

Academia and
non-profit

Student Report 2007

13

FY07 Economic Monitoring Report

Ri Economic
Monitoring
Collaborative

14

Rhode Island's Ports and Commercial Harbors: A
GIS Inventory of Current Uses and Infrastructure

Jennifer McCann

15

Rhode Island Pay Now Pay Later

16

Natural Hazards and Flood Plain Management in
Upper Narragansett Bay

USACE
Ri Bays, Rivers
and Watersheds
Coordination
Team
Rhode Island
Statewide
Planning
American
Security Project

American Security
Project
Malcolm Spaulding,
University of
James Hu,
Rhode Island
Christopher Baxter

(Green background indicates document was analyzed and coded)	
  

$

$

$

Damage'to'casino

$

$

B

I

Damage'to'fire'system'water'tower

$

$

I

B

Damage'to'LNG'and'LPG'tanks
Damage'to'parking'structure
Damage'to'warehouses,'office,'structures
Debris'causing'damage'to'structures
Flooding'damage'to'buildings
Fuel'tanks'breached
Roofs'blown'off
Tanks'floating'free
Warehouse'floors'blown'up'from'pressure

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$

$

$

$
$
$

$
$
$

Mechanical'and'electrical'system'damage $

$

D

Damaged&freight&and&cargo

D
I

Lost'or'damaged'freight'and'cargo
Containers'washed'inland

Table 10 -- Table of indirect costs

$

$

I

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$

B
D
D
D
I
B
D
B
D

B

I
D
B
D
I

D
I
I

Debris'field
Cost'to'clean'up'debris
Containers'all'over'city
Damage&off&port&property
Damage'to'offUport'roads'and'rail'lines
Transportation'sector'(general)

I
I
I
I

I
$

I
I

$

$
$

$

$

$
$
$

$
$
$

$
$
$

$
$
$

$

$
$

$
$

Damage&caused&by&debris&off&port&property
I
D

Providence

I

Gulfport

Damage&to&port&buildings&and&structures

B
D
I
D
D
B
D
I
I

Damage'to'port'roads'and'rail'lines
Damage&to&port&lands
Damage'to'construction'projects'
underway
Erosion'of'filled'land
Damage&to&port&facilities&(general)
Total'losses'at'all'MS'ports'99.9'million
Specific'port'damage'figures
General'damage'mention
Cost'of'rebuilding
Damage&to&port&equipment
Fencing'system'damage
Damage'to'port'equipment
Damage'to'cranes

Community/Environmental'Groups

B

$
$
$

$

Economic/Contractual

B
$

$

Public'policy'(Inc.'state/fed'taxpayers)

Internal'port

Providence

$

Gulfport

Damage&to&wharfs,&docks,&and&berthing&
areas
Boats'sinking'at'docks'and'cost'to'
remove'them
Damage'due'to'stress'on'vessel'mooring'
systems
Damage'to'wharf,'piers,'docks
Fill'eroded'around'berths
Rail'cars'ended'up'in'ship'berths
Damage&to&vessels&and&barges
'Casino'barge'broke'free
Damage&to&port&utilities&and&systems
Utility'damage'(general)
Sewer'lines'down
Power'loss

Community/Environmental'Groups

$'='Cost'borned'by'stakeholder'group

Public'policy'(Inc.'state/fed'taxpayers)

KEY
I'='Mentioned'in'interviews
D'='Mentioned'in'documents
B'='Mentioned'in'interviews'AND'
documents

Internal'port

DIRECT'DAMAGES

Economic/Contractual

Table 9 -- Table of direct damages

B

I

B
D

I

B
D
I
I
B
B
I

Lost%business%for%port%and%port%tenants
Tonnage(decline
Lost(tenants
Lost(revenue(to(port(businesses
Casino(losses
Delays%in%port3related%commerce%and%
increased%prices
Loss(of(facilities(at(port
Downtime(after(storm
Cost(of(materials(goes(up(due(to(port(
shutdown
Cost(to(rePdredge,(clear,(and(rePopen(
navigation(channel
Port(closed(to(navigation
Navigation(channel(closed
General(business(continuity(problems
Fisheries(losses
Debris(impacts(to(navigation
Cleanup%costs,%emergency%workers,%
emergency%services,%etc.
Housing(costs(for(relief(workers
Costs(to(the(state((cleanup,(emergency(
services,(etc.)
Costs(to(replace(buoys(moved(off(station
Other%hurricane3related%costs%for%port%and%
tenants
Port(evacuation(cost
Overtime(pay
Lawsuits(against(the(port(and(tenants
Insurance(costs(going(up
Carriers(need(to(move(equipment(to(
other(ports
Positive%spillovers
Accelerated(redevelopment(and(opened(
markets
New(business(can(result(from(
catastrophic(event

$
$

$

$

$
$
$
$

$

$

$
$
$

$

$

$
$
$

D
B
D
D

$

$
$

D
I

$

$

I

$

$

B

$
$
$

I
I

$
$
$
$

$
$

I

$

I

$

$

$

$

$

$

$

I

I
B
I
I

$
$
$
$
$

Providence

$
$

$
$
$

Gulfport

$
$
$
$

Community/Environmental(Groups

$
$
$
$

$(=(Cost(borned(by(stakeholder(group

Public(policy((Inc.(state/fed(taxpayers)

Economic/Contractual

KEY
I(=(Mentioned(in(interviews
D(=(Mentioned(in(documents
B(=(Mentioned(in(interviews(AND(
documents

Internal(port

INDIRECT(COSTS

I
$
$
$
$

I
I
I
I
I

$

D
I

)Unemployment)insurance)lost

✓

✓

✓

✓

I

)Lost)jobs

✓

✓

✓

✓

D

)Fluctuations)in)supply)and)demand)of)
labor)pool

✓

✓

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

✓

✓

I

)Emotional)toll)on)staff
General&disruptions&to&sense&of&normalcy&
and&quality&of&life
)Population)shifts
)Disruption)of)energy)supplies)(LNG,)LPG,)
Fuel)
Scale)of)disaster)is)overwhelming
Environmental&damages&to&waterways,&
ecosystems,&and&coastal&land&resulting&
from&release&of&materials&stored&at&port
)Pollution)to)bay)or)waterway
)Hazardous)materials)impacting)
sediments
)Loss)of)coastal)wetlands)and)ecosystems)
damages
)Coastal)land)damages
Cement)into)the)channel
Coal)washed)into)water
Contamination)caused)by)inundation
Liquid)asphalt)into)the)waterway
Difficulty&in&planning&and&development
)PreYstorm)business)plans)derailed
)Fluctuations)in)freight)patterns
Difficulties&in&obtaining&insurance
)Risks)become)uninsurable
)Moratorium)on)new)insurance)policies
Damage&at&the&port&prevents&more&
efficient&disaster&response&for&region
Can't)use)port)for)as)recovery)and)
response)platform)to)aid)region
Debris)hampers)emergency)and)repair)
crews
Surveying)and)navigation)recovery)
equipment)in)short)supply

✓

✓

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

I

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
I
I

✓

✓
✓

I
I

✓

✓

I

B

I

I
I
D
I

✓
✓

I

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

D

✓

✓

I

I

✓

I

B

✓

✓

i

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

I

✓

✓

B

B

✓

✓

I

I

)Role)of)ports)in)state)economy

✓

✓

D

)Lost)jobs)devastate)local)economy

✓

✓

I

)Local)economy)suffers)(general)

✓

✓

I

✓

)Debris)damming)up)marshes)and)wetlands)
and)preventing)normal)tidal)flushing

I

✓
✓

✓

Consequences&of&debris
)Debris)in)waterway)obstructs)navigation)
and)hinders)dredging
)Debris)gets)reported)and)recorded)causing)
paperwork)logjam
)Debris)from)port)ends)up)as)battering)ram)
✓
causing)other)damage

I

✓

Providence

I

Gulfport

✓

Community/Environmental)Groups

✓

Labor&and&employment&consequences

Economic/Contractual

Gulfport

✓

$)=)Cost)borned)by)stakeholder)group

Public)policy)(Inc.)state/fed)taxpayers)

Community/Environmental)Groups

✓

KEY
I)=)Mentioned)in)interviews
D)=)Mentioned)in)documents
B)=)Mentioned)in)interviews)AND)
documents

Internal)port

Public)policy)(Inc.)state/fed)taxpayers)

)Workers)stranded)at)port

INTANGIBLE)CONSEQUENCES

Providence

Internal)port

Economic/Contractual

Table 11 -- Table of intangible consequences

D

)Debris)as)pollution
)Debris)as)negative)impact)on)residential)
quality)of)life
)Debris)as)a)general)problem
Consequence&for&the&local&and&regional&
economy&from&losing&port&functionality
)Supply)chain)interruptions

✓

✓

Lost)jobs)devastate)local)economy

I

Small)businesses)forced)out)of)business)
due)to)recovery)costs
Business&operational&burdens
)Operations)continuity
)Lost)business)records
)Forced)to)work)from)temporary)facilities
Long)recovery)times
Port)facility)closures
Disruption&of&critical&services
Destruction)of)energy)infrastructure
Disruption)of)regional)energy)distribution
Interruption)of)critical)goods)supply

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

I
D

Interruption)of)essential)services

✓

✓

✓

✓

D

Interruption)of)power)supply

✓

✓

✓

✓

D

I
I
B
B

D
D
D
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